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PECKHAM.

Judge Fletcher had a great dislike for show and parade.
By his will he directed that his funeral should be private in
his own house. And he enjoined frequently upon his legal
friends to prevent the bar from meeting after his death to
pass resolutions in his praise. Perhaps in these particulars
his feeling was almost morbid. But it was evident he in.
tended as far as possible to prevent anything being said or
done in his honor beyond what he merited.
Judge Fletcher's success in life was more owing to his industry, perseverance and high moral character than to his other
powers, great as they certainly were. His memory is cherished by his friends, his clients and those who paw him only
in public with deep regard-we might say veneration. A full
account of his life would present a most instructive lesson to
S.S.
the younger members of the profession.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
JOSIAH CAPEN V. HENRY W. PECKHAM.
An entire case cannot be carried up by proceedings in error, but only particular errors in the rulings of the court.
Where, however, the question was whether several articles annexed to the
freehold were a part of the realty or were personal property, and the court
below in a hill of exceptions stated the facts with regard to each, and its de.
cisions as to its character, it was held that the decision as to each could be reviewed on a writ of error.
To constitute a fixture, it is necessary that it should appear, from all the circumstances, that a permanent annexation of the article to the freehold was
intended.
The character of the annexation is of great importance as showing theintent
with which it was made.
A windlass used in a slaughter-house, which passed through and turned in
timbers firmly secured to the building, held to be part of the realty.
Sundry other articles, used in the same building, not so firmly secured to the
building, held to be personal property.

TRESPASS on the case, for an injury to the plaintiff's reversionary interest in certain premises occupied as a sln.ughterhouse by the defendant, a tenant, in the removal of sundry
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articles claimed to be fixtures, with a count in trover for the
same articles as personal property.
The building had been erected for a slaughter-house by plaintiff, and the poles, wheel and shaft and ropes attached, windlass
anl ropes, four yokes or slides, one set of pulleys and blocks
with ropes, cross-bar and hooks, and the ring and staple mentioned in the first count of the declaration, had been put in by
him for purposes of slaughtering, and such building and articles
were used for the purposes of slaughtering continuously from
the time of the erection of the building until the articles were
removed, by the defsndit. The poles were each about thirty
feet long, corresponding with the length of said building, and
about tea inchesin diameter, and the ends were laid on opposite
beams of the building, about fifteen feet above the ground; each
of said slides or yokes was in the form of an ox-bow, with a bar
across the ends, to which was attached a hook, the ends of the
bow passing through the bar and being fastened by keys or
pins; these bows or slides were hung inverted on one or the
other of said poles, and were used for hanging the carcasses of
slaughtered animals; the wheel was about eight feet in diameter, and the shaft of it about fourteen feet long, corresponding
to the width of the building; the end of the shaft rested on the
opposite plates of the building, which were about twenty feet
above the ground, a notch being cut in each plate suitable to
hold the shaft in position, in which notches the ends of the shaft
were placed and revolved; attached to the shaft were two large
ropes with a hook in each; around the wheel and attached to it
was a rope, which also was attached to the windlass, by means
of which the wheel and windlass revolved together; the windlass was about three feet in length and the ends passed through
holes in two upright pieces of timber, which were firmly
nailed to the building at the top and bottom.
The house had passed by sundry mesne conveyances from
plaintiff to defendant and back again to plaintiff leaving a
lease-hold estate in defendant.
The defendant claimed that, notwithstanding the facts
above set forth, all said articles were personal pr, p'.rty, a ,
belonged to him, and the court below sustained t) 61ca'a
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The error assigned was in deciding upon the facts above
set forth, that said articles were personal property, and belonged to the defendant.
Barbour,for the plaintiff.
C. E. Perkins, for the defendant.
PARK, J.-We do not intend to relax the rule estabhshed by
repeated decisions during the last seventy years, that the whole
case tried in the court below cannot be brought up for review
in this court, but only the particular matter complained of in
the admission or rejection of evidence, or the rulings of the court
upon questions of law arising in the case: HcDonald v. Fisher,
Kirby 339; Wadsworth v. Sanford,Id. 456; Watson v. Wat.
son, 10 Conn. 75; Picket v. Allen, Id. 156; Lyme v. East Had.
dam, 14 Id. 394; Sharp v. Curtiss, 15 Id. 526; Shelton v.
Hoadley, Id. 535; Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Id. 121.
The counsel for the defendant claims that this case comes
under this rule, but we do not so regard it. The question
involved in it is, whether certain instruments put up in a
slaughter-house, adapted to the business of slaughtering animals, are personal property or real estate. The question applies to each article separately, and whether it is of the one
class or the other depends upon the facts applicable to it. One
article may be personal property and another real estate; hence
the court was called upon to decide in reference to each article
by itself. Suppose the plaintiff had specially requested the
court to rule, as matter of law, that the facts in relation to the
windlass, as detailed in the finding, showed it to be real es.
tate, and the court had refused so to rule; it is clear that in
a proper proceeding, stating the fact, the ruling of the court
could be reviewed without doing violence to the rule.
Now, substantially this was the case here. The plaintiff
insisted, as matter of law, that the facts detailed in the motion showed each article to be real estate. The court ruled
that each article was personal property. The claim and the
ruling applied to each article separately; and if in the case
supposed the ruling could be reviewed, so it can be here.
The plaintiff insists that the ruling of the court was wrong
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in axy view of the case; that if the articles were personal pro.
perty they were never sold by him, and consequently there
shomld have been a recovery on the second count of the declaration, and if they were a part of the realty, then there should
have been a recovery on the first count, as the defendant concedes. But there is nothing in the case that goes to show that
these articles were not sold by the plaintiff in connection with
the real estate, if they were personal property. They may
have been regarded by both parties to the sale as appurtenant
to the realty ; and if they were included in the contract and
delivered with tbe deed, the title to them passed to the vendee,
as much as it would if they were in fact a part bf the realty or
sold in a separate contract. Whether they were sold by the
plaintiff or not, was a question of fact for the court to deterjnine, and it is not the subject of review by this court.
Were these articles a part of the realty? This is the
only question that we can consider.
The books are full of decided cases upon the subject of fixtares, from the year books down to the present time; and,
strange to say, after all the ability that has been displayed
upon this subject, no rule can be found of universal application
that clearly defines the lines where an article loses its legalqdality as a chattel and assumes that of real estate.
Property is divided into two great divisions, things personal
and things real, and fixtures may be found along the dividing
line. They are composed of articles that were once chattels, or
such in their nature, and by physical annexation to real property
have become accessory to it and parcel of it. Hence in many
cases questions of great nicety must arise, where it is difficult
to determine, with any degree of satisfaction, where a chattel
has lost its natural character by annexation to real property or
not. Many rules may be found in the books to determine these
questions. One rule prevails where the question arises between
grantor and grantee, or executor and heir, and another between
landlord and tenant, and still another between the executor of
a tenant for life and the remainder-mar or reversioner, and in
sLch cases the question turns, not upon the character of the
annexations and considerations connected therewith, but upon
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the relation of the party making the annexation to the thing
annexed. And even in cases of landlord and tenant, a distinction is made between cases where the article is affixed for the
purposes of agriculture, and those where the same thing is
done for purposes of trade or manufacture.
It is not our purpose to go into any extensive examination of
the law upon this subject. The great weight of authority is in
favor of the doctrine that to constitute a fixture it is necessary
that the article should be annexed to the freehold, as the name
itself imports; but there is great diversity of opinion in relation
to the degree of annexation which is essential for this purpose:
Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636; Despatch Line of Packets
v. Bellamy Jfanuf. Co., 12 N. Ramp. 205; Farrarv. Chauffe.
tete, 5 Denio. 527; Farrarv. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 154; Gray
v. Holdship, 17 Serg. & R. 413; Gale v. Ward, 14 Mass. 352;
Murdock v. Gi~ford, 18 N. York 28; Swift v. Thompson, 9
Conn. 63 ; Balawin v. Walker, 21 Id. 168.
Many cases, both English and American, decide that the
annexation must be permanently made, so much so that the
article cannot be removed without injury to the freehold: Taffe
v. Warnick, 3 Blackf. 111; Gale v. Ward, supra; Heermance
-v. Verney, 6 Johns. 5; Cresson v. Stout, 17 Id. 116; Raymond v.
This,
White, 7 Cowen 319; Farrarv. Chaufetete, supra.
no doubt, is essential in a great majority of cases, but not in
all. Mill-stones and water-wheels used in milling establishments are universally gonceded to be a part of the realty; still
many of them could be removed without the least injury to the
freehold. The fences that are used to separate the lots of farm.
ers are not embedded in the earth, so as to occasion injury to
the soil by their removal, and still no one could doubt that
they are fixtures or appurtenant to the realty.
Another class of cases holds that the true test of a fixture is
the adaptation of the article to the uses and purposes to which
the realty is applied, and no regard is had to the character of
the annexation: loorhis v. Freeman, 2 Watts & Serg. 116;
Pyle v. Pennock, Id. 390; 2 Smith Lead. Gas. (H. & W. ed.)
216. This rule is too extensive in its application, for it includes
all the machinery in mechanical and manufacturing establish.
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ments, when the connection to the freehold is made for the purpose of keeping them in position for the successful working of
them, but with no design on the part of the owner to constitute them a part of the realty.
It is excedingly difficult to lay down any rule of universal
application upon this subject, but one perhaps that comes nearer
to it than any other is, that it is essential to constitute a fixture
that an article should not only be annexed to the freehold, but
that it should clearly appear from an inspection of the property
itself, taking into consideration the character of the annexation,
the nature and tb6 adaptation of the article annexed to the
uses and purposes to which that part of the building was appropriated at the time the annexation was made, and the relation
of the party making it to the property in question, that a permanent accession to the freehold was intended to be made by
the annexation of the article. This rule is in harmony with
many of the cases: Lawtyn v. Salmon, 1 H. Black, 259 ; .MHurdock v. Gifford, 18 N. York, 28; Winslow v. Merchants' InsCO., 4 Met. 306; Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio S. R. 511, 540.
This rule shows the reason why it is held in many cases that
it is essential to constitue a fixture that the annexation should
be so permanently made, that the articles could riot be removed
without injury to the freehold, for it is easy t6 see that in a
great majority of cases the intent of the party to make a per
manent accession to the freehold can only be shown by the
character of the annexation, for there is nothing in the nature
of the case, except this, that goes to show the intent, and such
an intent to make the annexation a permanent one must affirmatively appear or the article will be deemed to be personalty.
This rule explains the reason why this law is said to be
indulgent to a tenant in cases that arise between him and his
landlord, and declares that to be a chattel which between grantor and grantee would be held to be real estate. This arises
from the fact, that when a tenant erects expensive structures
'for the carrying on of his trade or business, which can be
removed without destruction to them or material injury to the
freehold, the relation of the tenant to the property in question
renders it unreasonable to suppose that he intended to make
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them a part of realty belonging to another, thus making a
donation of them to the owner of the soil.
This rule was substantially recognized in the case of Swift v.
Tkompson, 9 Conn. 63. In that case the question was whether
the machinery adapted to the manufacture of cotton cloth in a
manufacturing establishment was a part of the realty or not.
The case finds that all the machinery could be removed without
any injury to the freehold. The court say, in giving their
opinion, " It is material here to observe that an important part
of the description is, that they were thus attached to the building to render them stable, but that they might be removed to
any other place without any injury to the freehold. To operate
successfully, they must be fixed like clocks, and many other
articles which are clearly personable and moveable. We resort
then to the criterion established by the rules of the common
law. Could this property be removed without injury to the freehold? The case finds this fact. This then should satisfy us."
The court say that the fact is material and important, that
the articles were attached to the freehold simply to render them
sufficiently stable for the successful working of them. Why
was this fact material and important? Because it showed for
what purpose the annexation of the articles was made, that it
was done with no design to make them a part of the realty.
It should be observed that there was nothing in this case that
could show that these articles were a part of the realty but the
character of their annexation, and in order to render that sufficient to show an intent on the part of the party making it to
constitute the articles a part of the freehold, it was necessary
that the articles should be so attached to the realty that they
could not be removed without damage to the building. Judge
CHuirch, in giving the opinion of the court, in the case of Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168, remarks, "that whether the
machinery used in a factory is a party of the realty or not,
d~pends upon the manner of its connection, with it. This is
undoubtedly true in relation to articles of that description, as
we have seen.
The application of these views to the case under consideration
shows all the articles to be personal property with the exception
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of the windlass, for they all could be removed without the least
injury to themselves or building, and there are no other considerations that show a design to make them a part of the
realty, unless it be the character of the articles themselves.
They were adapted, itis true, to the uses and purposes to which
the building was applied at the time they were attached, but
this merely shows that they were proper subjects to be made a
part of the Yealty, and not that they were intended so to be.
If the articles had been ponderous and exceedingly difficult to
be removed, if they had been of considerable value taken in
connection with the building and of little value as chattels to
be removed, if they had been fitted to the places they occupied
and would not be suited to any other places or building unless
specially prepared for them, such considerations might go far
to show that they were designed to be a part of the realty.
In relation to the windlass, we are inclined to think, as the
facts now appear, that it was a part of the realty. The case
finds that the ends of it passed through and turned in timbers
which were firmly secured to the building. It was as firmly
attached as its nature would admit of, if it was designed ever
so strongly to be made a part of the permanent structure. It
could not have been removed without injury to the building
and to the article itself. This shows that it was designed to
be a part of the building, and there is nothing in the case that
tends to rebut the presumption. These facts may, however,
be disproved upon another trial, and the article shown to be
personal property.
We, therefore, advise the Superior Court that there is manifest error in the judgment complained of, and that it be reversed.
By the courtesy of the reporter,
Mr. Hooker, we have been allowed to
select the foregoing case form the
advance sheets of his next volume,
We are not aware that there is anything of special difficulty in it, but if
ive understandthe facts, the apparatus
in question all pertained to the same
object, that of handling heavy animals
in the process of being slaughtered
and iressed for the market, and if so

according to the general course of the
more recent decisions, should all have
been treated as part of the realty, as
between grantorandgranteecertalnly.
There seems to have been no question that the plaintiff owned the lana
and erected the building for a slanghter-house, and it is expressly found
that he iput in the above-mentioned
articles for the purpose of slaughtering, and such building and articler
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were used for the purpose of slaugh- perhaps all that the case requires for
lering continuously from the time of its justification. And it seems by the
the erection of the building until the court to be placed solely upon the
articles were removed by the defend- ground that the things in question
what renders the case a were removable "without the least
ant." Ad
more striking one for the plaintiff is, injury to themselves or the building,
that he conveyed the land through and there are no other consid-rations
one other to the defendant, and the that show a design to Tnake them a
defendant reconveyed it to tile plain. part of the realty, unless it be the
tiff through one other, and that the character of the articles themselves."
substantially But with all possible respect for the
conveyance was all
alike conveying only the realty with opinion of this very able court, we
the appurtenances, and making no must add, and the fact that these artiother reference to any personality or cleswere originall4, placed in the buildfixtures, and that the defendant's only ing in order to fit it for its designed
title to the things in controversy wa s use, and had passed as part of the
through the plaintiff's deed, and he realty by four successive conveyances of
is now compelled to the contention the really. It seems to us nothing
that his own deed did not reconvey could be more conclusive that this of
the same title which he derived under the purpose in placing these articles
the plaintiff's deed or else he must In the building and thus suffering
contend that lie has acquired title to them to remain there through so manj
this property by the statute of limita- conveyances (luring a period of nearll
tions, and can now hold them against twenty years.
the plaintiff, equitable title and with
But this old test of determining
out an equivalent, except possibly in what is a fixture, or part of the freesome variation in the price at the dif- hold, If it ever had any force, has
ferent sales, which does not appear been long since effectually broken
but which may possibly have existed down and abandoned. The learned
and have some effect upon tile defend- judge, in the foregoing opinion, names
ant's sense of justice in the matter, some very significant instances where
but which, if it existed, could not of portions of the realty may be removed
course offset the exact law applicable without the application of force. And
to the facts. It the foregoing is a cor- the illustrations mightbe carried much
rect statement of the facts (and we further.
Vindow-blinds, double winhad almost said we hope it may not dows, and the windows and doors
be, but we can make nothing else of often, may all be removed from dwelit), the decision is one that does not lings without violence or the slightes;
much commend itself to our sense of injury to the articles or to the house.
justice. whatever may be said in favor except from their absence. The same
of the necessity of coming to that con- is true of most of the fixtures about
clusion, in order to uphold the law.
gardens and lawns. And so, equally
But it seems to us that the decision of much of the machinery about mills
is one that the law will not vindicate and manufactories. That rule cannot
any more than the sense of justice. be any longer maintained with any
It may be in conformity with the local show or reason of plausibility.
The modern rule, with some except
law of Connecticut, and if so, that is
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Io s hereafter noted, seems to be
based more upon the point whether
the article in question was placed in
the building for the purpose of cor
pleting the building or offurnishlng It?
The question is whether the article is
part of the building, or merely furniture and machinery to aid in carrying
on the business, of living there, or of
manufacturing, or of whatever other
use the occupier may choose to put it
to. The character of articles will vary
somewhat with the taste and the
fashion of the time. It was formerly
supposed that the apparatus for heating a dwelling and for producing heat
for cooking, must be provided in the
building itself, and as part of it. But
upon the general 'use of stoves they
were treated as part of tie furniture,
both for cooking and warming. But
more recently matters seem to be returning to the former rule, furnaces
and cooking-ranges being held more
or less indispensable in dwellings,
an, of course, forming portions of the
reality.
A brief reference to tle late cases
will sufficiently illustrate and fortify
our position. In D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, L. R., 3 Eq., 382, Lord ROMILLY
X. R., held that tapestry, pictures,
impanels, frames filled with satin,
and attached to the walls, and also,
statues, figures, vases, and stone garden seats, purchased and placed by the
testator, and which were essentially
part of the house, or of the architectural designs ofthebuildings orgrounds,
however fastened, were fixtures, and
could notbe removed: but that glasses
and pictures not in panels, not being
ptrt of the building, passed under the
testator's wilL But articles purchased
by the testator, but not affixed to the
dwelling till after the testator's decease, were not fixtures. And Lord
Vor. XVI-10

Justice GiwrAuD, a very learned and
able lawyer, in the recent case of Re
Rickards & Hill, Law Rep., 4 Ch.,
App., 630, held that where in iron
works thJ rolling-mills required a
large number of iron rolls for their
convenient operation, the rollers being of different sizes, and sometimesin
duplicate, and there were also sets or
rolls in the mill, which had been procured for use there, but required further fitting In order to be used, that
these rolls, which had been in actual
use, formed a portion of the rollingmill. and were, consequently, fixtures.
as between the mortgagee of the realty
and the assignee in bankruptcy; but
that the other rolls were mere personalty, and passed to the assignees. There
were, also, weighing-machines sunk
into the floor of tie factory, each machine resting on brickwork at the bottom of the hole, and the sides of the
hole being faced with brickwork.
these machines rested mainly by their
own weight on the brickwork, without any fastening, and were held not
to be fixtures. There were also Imbedded in the floor of the tactory.
wich was covered with iron flooringplates, some long iron plates, called
-straightening plates," which were
used tor straightening bars of iron
when drawn out of the furnace.
These straightening plates were laid
upon a platform of brickwork, and
were held to be fixtures.
The rule in regard to trade-fixtures
we know, is made very liberal in favor
of the tenant, in order to allow him to
remove whatever he places upon or
even temporarily annexes to the freehold for mere convenient use, as was
said by KzLvT, Ch. B., in Climie v.
Wood, Law Rep., 3 Exch., 257. But
in favor of the grantee or mortgagee
these trade-fixtures are held to pass
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a in the case last cited, where a steamengine and boiler, placed in a manufactory by the mortgagor before the
execution of the mortgage, for the convenience of carrying on his business,
the engine being screwed down to
some thick planks which lay upon the
ground, and the boiler fixed in brickwork, and it was held to have passed
under the deed as a fixture which the
grantor could not remove. The same
rule was extended to trade-fixtures of
a similar character annexed to premises in a similar mode, and some of
it not fastened at all, by the mortgagor and his partner, after the execution of the mortgage, to enable them
the more conveniently to carry on
their business, in Celwuick v. Swindell, Taw Rep., 3 Eq., 249. And in
WMhnlZey v. Mfine, 7C. B., N. S., 115;
S. C., 6 Jur., N. S., 125, where the
mortgagor, after the execution of the
mortgage, had erected for the more
convenient use of the premises in his
business of an Innkeeper, brewer, and
bath proprietor, a steam-engine and

boiler, a hay-cutter, malt-mill or corn
crusher, and a pair of grinding-stones,
which were not so fastened but that
they could be removed without Injury
to themselves or the brewery, and
all being subservient to the business
of the mortagor, It was held that
these erections became fixtures, and
passed to the assignee of the mortgagee.
We do 4ot see how the defendant
in the previous case can claim to stand
in any other condition than a grantor
or mortgagor. If he is, in form, a
tenant, that must be subject to his
higher position of grantor. And he
has no claim to treat these articles as
trade- fixtures, not being placed there
by himself, or by 9ny one as tenant,
but by the plaintiff, as owner of.the
freehold, and so held by all the subsequent owners of the land. It does
really seem that the defendant has
not much ground to stand upon, unless the peculiarities of the law of that
State may afford him some counteL F. R.
nance.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
ELISHA RUCKMAN V. BENJAMIN W. KING.
BENJAMIN W. KING V. ELISHA RUCKMAN.
In general, time is not of the essence of a contract to sellland, but it may
be made so either by the contract itself or by the nature of the subject-matter,
or by express notice requiring the contract to be fulfilled or rescinded within
a reasonabla time stated.
Paro. evidence is admissible to show that at the making of the contract time
was considered of the essence of it.
at
A stipulation to convey on receiving certain payments and mortgage " the
Ume and in tne manner mentioned," is not sufficient in itself to make time of
the essence of the contract, but under the circumstances of this case they are
held sufficient.
A contract to convey lands described, "and also two lots of land situate in
Hackensack township, at a specified price per acre for the whole, is too uncer
1PAn to enable a court of equity to decree specific performance.
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THESE were separate bills; King's for specific performance
of a contract, and Ruckman's to have the contract declared
void for non-performance.
By the contract, which was under seal, and executed by both
on the 12th of May, 1868, Ruckman agreed to sell to King a
number of tracts of land in the county of Bergen, and in Rock.
lanl county, New York, describing them as all the lands he
owned and held contracts for in the township of Harington,
east of the old Closter road, and between the Alpine road and
the north line of New Jersey, also all his land in Rockland
county, east of the' old Closter road, "and also two lots of
land, situate in Hackensack township, in the counity of Bergen;" the whole of the premises containing about two thousand acres, portion of the above bounded by the Hudson river.
The price was to be $275 per acre, which King agreed to pay,
as follows: $100 at the execution of the contract; $19,900
in cash on June 1, 1868; $80,000 in cash on July 1, 1868,
on delivery of the deed, and the balance to be secured by'
mortgage, to be paid at times and in instalments specified.
Rackman agreed, "on receiving such payments and such
mortgage at the time and in the manner above mentioned," to
convey the premises in fee. The deed was to be delivered at
the office of Chas. H..Voorhis, in Jersey City, July 1, 1868.
At the drawing of the agreement Ruckman wanted the first
$20,000 to be paid, so as to enable him to perform his contracts for the purchase of lands mentioned in the agreement,
and while it was being drawn they had considerable discussion about it. Ruckman wanted it fixed for May 22; King
did not want it included in the written contract, which he
wished to be for payment of $99,900 on the first of July, and
that Ruckman should take his word for the payment of the
$19,900 before that time; he said he would pay it in a few
days; Ruckman refused to accede to this, but gave to the
first of June for the payment, and insisted upon that being
stipulated in the contract, "asit was afterward written.
On the 28th of May, King applied to Ruckman for an extension of the time of payment of the $19,900, to June 15th, and
presented to him, for signature, a written agreement to that
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effiut, endorsed on the duplicate of the contract taken by
King. This Ruckman decidedly refused to do, and told King
that he would hold him to strict payment on the day.
Ruckman stated that he also told King that he would stay
at his own house all day to receive it. King stated that Ruckman told him to be at the offiee of Voorhis to pay it, and that
he would be there to receive it. King, accompanied by a man
whose name he did not disclose, and which he said he did not
recollect, bat whom he described as an old patient, came to the
office of Voorhis on the first day of June, and produced $19,900,
which he counted out before Voorhis. He inquired for Rack
man, and said that he came there with the money for the purpose of making payment to Ruckman. Voorhis had no authority to receive it, and be did not offer it to Voorhis. King
asked Voorhis if Ruckman would be there. Voorhis told him
that he would not be there; and he had seen Ruckman a day
or two before, and told him, in answer to an inquiry, that, as the
contract was silent as to the place of payment, it was payable
at Ruckman's house, and that Ruckman said he would remain home all day to receive it. King contended that the
money was payable at the office of Voorhis, because the deed
was to be delivered there. Voorhis told him that it was not,
and advised him if he wanted to make a valid tender to go
to Ruckman's house, which could be easily reached by a train
which would leave at twenty minutes past one, and from which
he could return that afternoon; King declined to do this.
It was then half-past twelve o'clock. King did not say to
Voorhis that-Ruckman had promised to meet him there. No
further tender of the $19,900 was made.
On the first of July, King went to the office of Mr. Voorhis,
accompanied by two persons interested with him in this contract, and by two counselors at law, and with $99,900 to make
the tender and demand the deed. Ruckmau was not there, nor
did he go to that-office that day. Bat at four o'clock all five
went to the depot of the Northern Railroad, where they found
Ruckman seated in the car on his way home, and tendered him
the money, which he refused to receive. Ruckman considered
the contract void on account of the failure of King to comply
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with its terms in making the second payment. King contended that he made the tender of the second payment in compliance with the terms of the contract and the arrangement
made between him and Ruckman, and that even if he did not,
in this case time was not of the essence of the contract, and
thai the court should enforce it upon his complying with the
subsantial terms required by it.
S. B. Ransom for Ruckman.
A. S. Boyd and Fowler & Holcomb for King.
ZABRISKIE, C.-[After stating the facts in detail] There are
two questions on the performance, one a question of law,
whether in this case time was of the essence of the contract;
the other a question of fact, whether the office of Voorhis was
agreed upon as the place for the second payment. There is
also a question of law upon the contract, whether it is sufficiently certain and definite for a court of equity to enforce.
The established doctrine of equity is that, in general, time is
not of the essence of a contract for the sale of lands. But it is
now also settled that in such contracts time may become of the
essence of the contract, either by being made so by the contract
itself, or from the nature and situation of the subject matter of
the contract, or by express notice given requiring the contract
to be closed or rescinded at a stated time, which must be a
reasonable time according to the circumstances of the case.
It was at first held by the English Court of Equity, that in
such contracts time could not be made of the essence of the
contract, and that such agreement would not be enforced any
more than an agreement to limit the right of redemption by
a mortgagor.
Lord THURLOW, in Williams v. Banham, 1 Sugd. on Vend.
303, where the contract was, that if the title should not be
made out in three years the agreement should be void, held
that the time fixed was only formal, and not of the essence of
thi agreement.
In Gregson v. Riddle, stated in 7 Ves. 268, in Sir S. Romilly's argument, Lord LOUGHBOROUGH, as commissioner of
the great seal, and afterward Lord THURLOW, as chancellor,
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held that a stipulation that the agreement should be void if the
title was not completed at a given day, was of no validity; and
in. answer to a proposition of Mr. Mansfield that it would be
necessary to insert a provision that it should be void notwithstandingthe decision of the Court of Chancery, Lord THURLOW
replied, "that the parties then would be just as forward asthey
are now." Lord THURLOW, without doubt, entertained the
idea that equity would not allow the parties to make time the
essence of such contract. But he was the only English chancellor who adhered to that doctrine. Lord LOUGHBOROUGH,
who had countenauced it, afterward in his decisions held the
contrary. In Loyd v. Collet, 4 Bro. C. C. 469, he says:
"There is nothing of more importance than that the ordinary
contracts between man and man should be certain and fixed,
and that it should be certainly known when a man is bound
and when he is not. It is one thing to say that time is so essential that in no case in which the day has by any means been
tuffered to elapse, the court would relieve against it and decree
performance. The conduct of the parties, inevitable accident,
&c., might induce the court to relieve. But it is a different
thing to say that the appointment of a day is to have no effect
at all, and that it is not in the power of the parties to contract
that if the agreement is not executed at a particular time the
parties shall be at liberty to rescind it." Lord ELDoN, in 1802,
in Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 270, said: "I am inclined much to
think, nothwithstanding what was said in Gregson v. Riddle,
that time may be made the essence of the contract." This continued to be his settled opinion, as is shown in Levy v. Lindow,
3 Mer. 81; Boehrm v. Wood, 1 J. & W. 419, and Wilby v.
Cottle, Turn. & Russ. 78.
In Eaton v. Lyon, 3 Ves. 692, in 1798, the Master of the
Rolls said: "The doctrine has been formerly carried to a
length that became in some degree alarming, but undoubtedly
in modern times that has been much restrained. If the purchase
money of an estate has been covenanted to be paid at a given day,
and it is not paid at that day, at law no action will lie, but if the
party can show that he took the means of paying it, and has
been prevented by accidents not in his power, the court will
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dispense with th strict performance of it, because, as it was
formerly said, time is not of the essence of the contract; but
it may be of the essence of the contract."
In Hudson v. Bartram, 3 Madd. 447, Sir

JOHN LEACH

says: "Although it was for a long time doubted whether
time could be made of the essence of a contract, yet that point
has been settled by Lord ELDON; here, as at law, it may be
of the essence of the contract."
In Hipwell v. Knight, Y. & Coll. Ex. 401, Baron ALDERSON,
in delivering the opinion of the court, holds that time may be
made the essence of a contract to convey, and that in the case
before the court it was made so-and he relies upon the fact
that the agreement in that case was changed from three to
four months, as originally drawn, to show that time was intended to be of the essence of the contract. And the Vice
Chancellor of England, in the case of Lloyd v. Rippingale, referred to in the argument of Hipwell v. Knight,1 Y. & C.Ex.
410, held that express words would make it so. Sir J. R)MiLLY, M. R., in iloneymam v. Afaryatt, 21 Beav. 14, held that

time might be made the essence of a contract; and again, in
Parcin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 65, he says: "Although the doctrine of Lord THURLOW, that time could not be made the essence of the contract in equity, has long been exploded, yet
time is held to be of the essence of a contract in equity only in
cases of direct stipulation or of necessary implication. The
cases of direct stipulation are when the parties introduce a
clause expressly stating that time is to be of the essence of the
contract. The implication is derived from the circumstances
of the case, such as where the property is required for some
immediate purpose, such as trade or mhnufacture. Lord CRANWORTH, when Vice Chancellor, in Parkin v. Thorold, 1 Sim.,
N. S. 1, held that when a purchaser has agreed that he will
take a title, if made at a given day, but otherwise that he will
not, a court of equity cannot, any more than a court of law,
'give relief to a vendor who has failed to make a title at the
day specified, and says: "The doctrine -of Lord TaURLOW,
that a purchaser could not so stipulate, rested on no principle,
and has often been repudiated as not truly expressing the
doctrine of the Court of Chancery."
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The same doctrine has been adopted and repeatedly applied
in the courts of this country: Benedict v. Lynch, 1 J. 0. I,
370; Wells v. Smith, 7 Paige, 22; Nelson v. fMitchell, 4 Ed
Ch.R. 697; Langworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 399; S. 0. 14
Pet. 173. In the last case, Justice STORY, in delivering the
opinion of the court, says: "In the first place there is no doubt
that time may be of the essence of a contract on the sale of
property. It may be so by the express stipulation of the
parties, or it may arise by implication from the very nature of
the property or the avowed objects of the seller or the purchaser."
I concur in the conclusion arrived at by Sir EDWARD
SUGDEN in his valuable treatise, p. 305, as the result of the
decisions: "That if it clearly appears to be the intention of
the parties to an agreement that time shall be deemed of the
essence of the contract, it must be so considered in equity."
Mr. Fry, in his treatise on specific performance, has arrived
at the same conclusion: § 711, 712 & 713.
A time stipulated on an agreement for performance will be
held of the essence of the contract, when, from the nature of
the subject matter or the object of the parties, the time of performance was intended to be such: Hepwell v. Knight, 1 Y. &
Coll. Ex. 416; Levy v. Lindo, 3 Mer. 81; Coslake v. Till, 1
Russ. 376 ; Wilby v. Cottle, Turn. & Russ. 81; Wallcer v. Jeffreys, 1 Hare, 341 ; W'right v. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu. 170
McKay v. Carrington,1 McLean, 50; Holt v. Rogers, 8 Pet.
420; Young's Administrators v. Rathbone, 1 0. E. Green 224;
Fry on Spec. Per. § 713 to 717.
A party -will be allowed to show by parol that at the making
of the contract time was considered as of the essence. Nokps
v. Ld. Kilmony, 1 De Gex & Sm. 440. And a new agreement
extending the time is evidence that they consider the time
material: Wiswell v. JfcGown, 2 Barb. S.0. 270.
I do not think that the provision contained in the stipulation
in the contract on the part of Ruckman, which is that upon
receiving such payments and such mortgage at the time and in
the manner above mentioned, he will convey, are sufficient of
themselves to make the time of the essence of the contract; the
words to have that effect must be clearly indicative of the inten.
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tion of the parties. But these words, connected with the negotiation aid statements at the time of the contract, are suffi.
cient, in my opinion, to make time of the essence of this contract, and do make it so.
Ruckman, at the drawing of the contract, expressly told
K ng that he wanted the $19,900 to enable him to fulfill his
-3ontracts for purchase, which were part of the subjectmatter
of the agreement. Te time of the payment was changed from
May 22 to June 1, at King's solicitation, and Ruckman resisted
all entreaties to put it off; or to accept King's verbal promise
instead of the written stipulation. The words.of the contract,
with these facts: create, in our view, an express stipulation that
time is the essence of the contract. The application for the
written extension on the 28th of May, and the tender or coming
ready to tender the payment at Voorhis' office on the very day,
is evidence that King so understood the contract. Again, the
subject-matter of the contract, and the situation of it, make
time the essence of this contract. The subject-matter was not
a dwelling-house, or a manufactory, or a place for trade, or a
reversion which among others are held to make time essential;
but it was a large .number of tracts, held and bought for sale
at a period when the prices of lands were high, and their stability could not be relied on. This of itself is sufficient to make
the stipulation as to time material and therefore essential.
Part of these lands depended on contracts for purchase, made
by Ruckman; a rise in price might induce those who had sold
to him to evade their contracts, if not legally binding, or litigate and delay the fulfillment of such as were legal; and, more
than all, money was to be paid on these contracts, and the sum
to be paid on the 1st of June was relied on for that purpose;
Ruckman had a right to rely on it. And the fact that he did
so, or stated that he did so, at the making of this contract, of
itself,would make time of the essence of the contract, from the
subject-matter, without any agreement on the subject. And in
such case, as to the point whether time is of the essence of the
contract when made, it is perfectly immaterial whether he actually needed the money, or whether he suffered any loss by the
want cf it. Where the subject is a dwelling-house, or a manu
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factory, or a reversion, time is material, without regard to
the question whether any loss or inconvenience is produced by delay.
And in this case nothing has been done byRuckman to continue
the contract. He has entered into no new negotiation with King.
On the 28th of May he told him he would insist upon payment
at the time; on June 2, he left a notice at King's house; on the
4th of June he told him the contract was void, and, according
to King's testimony, abused him violently; and, in his presence, proceeded to negotiate a sale with another purchaser.
The next question is that of fact; whether King made the
tender required by the contract. The effect of the contract
required King to pay the money to Ruckman, and to find him
for the purpose of payment, or use reasonable diligence to find
him. That is usually held to be accomplished by going to the
place of business or to the residence of the payee. But if the
parties have agreed upon another place, the place agreed upon
would be the proper place to offer the payment. And this
places the whole question upon the fact whether Ruckman
agreed to meet King at Voorhis' office, and told him to be their
to make the payment. Ruckman and King differ in their testimony as to this point. The burden of proof is upon King,
and in this situation he would fail. But he has brought witnesses to impeach the character of Ruckman for truth and
veracity, and, if successful in this, his testimony would prevail,
as nothing is shown against his own character. But I do not
think that the testimony on the part of King shows that Ruckman has a general reputation, in his neighborhood, as a man
of untruth or an habitual liar. * * * By the weight of
evidence, I feel bound to believe that Ruckman did not make
an agreement with King to meet him at the office of Voorhis,
but told him that he would remain home to receive the payment. If there were no agreement, King was bound to seek
Ruckman to make the payment, and the burden is on him to
show that Rackman agreed to meet him at a certain place.
On this view- there is no mistake or inevitable accident to
excuse King. If he thought at first that the office of Voorhis
was the legal place, or that Ruckman meant to meet him there,
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that mistake was corrected by Voorhis in time for him to go to
Ruckman's house and make the payment. From his conduct
on that day and afterward, in not making any tender, or proffering himself ready to perform the contract, or giving notice
that he would insist upon it, Ruckman had a right to infer
that he intended to abandon it, and not exert himself to be
ready with the title and conveyance on July 1st. And I think
such inference is fairly to be drawn by this court in disposing
of the cause. These reasons are, in my opinion, sufficient to
defeat King's right to a specific performance.
There is another ground taken, that the land to be conveyed
is not designated in the contract with sufficient certainty. As
to the parts in Harrington township and the county of Rockland the description is sufficiently certain. It is all the lands
owned by Ruckman, or for which he held contracts within cer.
tain boundaries.

The maxim is: Id certum est quod certum

reddi potest. It can be shown with certainty what lands be
owned or held contracts for in those boundaries. But the last
clause seems uncertain. It is, simply, "also two lots of land in
Hackensack township, county of Bergen;" it does not describe
them as two lots owned by him, for then, if he owned only two
lots there, it might be rendered certain. This contract would
be complied with, by his conveying tWo lots of ten feet square,
or two lots containing one thousand acres. Nor can this part
be rejected as immaterial, and performance be ordered of the
residue upon compensation. What the lots Were, and what
the compensation would be, must, in that case, be ascertained
by parol, in face of the statute of frauds. If the two lots
were one thousand acres of salt meadow, worth $25 an acre,
the compensation to Ruckman would be large, $250,000. If
they were each fifty acres, fronting on the Hudson, worth
$2,275 per acre, the compensation to King would be $200,000. Either of these suppositions would be possible, and it
seems to me that this is an uncertainty, which must prevent
a court of equity from granting relief to King.
I am of opinion that the bill of King must be dismissed
with costs, and that Ruckman is entitled to have the contract
declared void and given up to be canceled
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A tax for a private purpose is unconstitutional, and a statute imposing it Is
void. &public use or purpose is essential to the idea of a tax.
The rights of tazation and of eminent domain are separate and distinct rights,
and the public use sufficient to support legislation for one purpose is not necessarily sufficient to support it for the other.
The public use, which justifies the exercise of eminent domain consists in the
possession and enjoyment of theland itself by thepublic or public agencies, and
not in the mere incidental advantages that may accrue to the public from the
enterprise.
The possession by the public, which constitutes the public use, in the case of
railroads and similar corporations. in whose favor the right of eminent domain
has been exercised consists in the fact that the corporation must perform its
duties for the public on tenuer oi tWe proper compensation, and the fact that
the State retains the rightto control the franchise and limit the tolls to be charged.
But such a qualified and limited public use will not support tazation for the
sole and direct benefit of the corporation.
Therefore, a statute levying a tax for the sole purpose of making a direct girt
of the money raised to a mere private railway in which the State or the tax.
payers have no ownership is unconstitutionat.

The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
J. C. Sloan and Bennett & Norcross, for plaintiff.
Hatt. H. Carpenter, and J. A Bently, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Dixon, C. J.-These are two appeals in the same action, the one
by the plaintiff from a final judgment dismissing his complaint, and
the other by the defendants from a previous order of the court denying their motion to dissolve and vacate a preliminary injunction
which had been granted in the cause on the application of the plain.
tiff. The question involved in these appeals is the same as that discussed in the recent case of Curtis v. Whipple (referred to in note,
infra), and after what was there said in relation to it, a very
lengthy examination will not be necessary., The question is as to
the power of the legislature to raise money or to authorize it to be
raised by taxation for the purpose of donating it to a private corporation. We there held that the legislature possessed no such
power, and the conclusion in that case we think follows inevitably
in this, from the principles stated in the opinion. The cases are
uot distinguishable, except in the single circumstance that the corporation here, to which it is proposed to give the money, is a railroad company, in behalf of which the power of eminent domain has
been exercised by the State for the purpose of enabling it to secure
the land over which to build its road. It is contended that this
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circumstance so completely separates the cases as to render wholly
inapplicable, to a railroad company, a fundamental principle with
regard to the power of taxation which controls asto all other private
corporations and prohibits the making of similar donations to them:
in other words, that it changes the corporate character of such company, and transforms it from a private into an altogether public
corporatibn, so that the people may be taxed for the purpose of
giving the money directly to it.
If this position were correct, then undoubtedly the deduction
would be that the taxation is valid. But we deny the correctness
of the position, and, on the contrary, affirm that though a railroad
company may be, as to its capacity to assume and exercise in the
name of the State the power of eminent domain delegated to it, so
far a public or quasi public corporation, yet in all its other powers,
functions and capacities, it is e9sentially a private corporation, not
distinguishable from any other of that name or character. As to
the use of the land for the purpose of a highway, and the right of
the public to pass and repass over it, and to enjoy the advantages
afforded by it for the transportation of merchandise and productions
of the country, from one place to another, upon the payment of reasonable fare or charges, the corporation may be said to be public,
but in all other respects it is private. The public having the power
for itself to condemn the land on payment ofjust compensation, and
to build, equip and operate the road, and to charge toll or fare for
its use, or for the carriage and transportation of passengers and
merchandise, that power, subject to the continued enjoyment by the
public as a matter of right and not by the permission of the corporation only, of the same benefits of carriage and transportation
upon the same conditions as to payment of fare and charges, may
be exercised in behalf of a private corporation, and so far changes
its character, but no further. That such is the true corporate character of a railroad company is a proposition, we think, requiring
very little argument or elucidation. It is plain to the mind of
every intelligent person who has given the subject the slightest consideration. The road, with all its rolling-stock, buildings, fixtures,
and other property pertaining to it, is private property, owned,
operated and used by the company for the exclusive benefit
and advantage of the stockholders This constitutes a pi ivate corporation in the fullest sense of the term, and were we to attempt
to distinguish between such a corporation and an incorporated institution of learning like that in Curtis v. WTipple, and show that
money might be raised by taxation, to be given to the former, but
not to the latter,'it would be a task which we should despair of
accomplishing to the satisfaction of any one not far more skilled in
the subtleties of the law than we ourselves profess or ever expect
to be.
And if we examine any book of authority on the subject, we shall
find that such is and always has been the rule of the law as to the
corporate character of such companies, notwithstanding the delegation of the power of eminent dcmain, and their consequent subjection in a certain degree to public use and convenience. They
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are always classed among private corporations, such as banking
insurance and manufacturing corporations, and corporations for the
building of bridges, turnpikes, canals, etc. Messrs. Angell and
Ames, in their work on corporations, section 40, expressly so classify them, and speaking of them in connection with those last above
named, say: "The latter kind have a concern with some of the
expensive duties of the State, the trouble and charge of which are
undertaken and defrayed by them in consideration of a certain
emolument allowed to their members." As a matter of law, the
duties of railroad companies to receive and carry passengers and
goods, differ very slightly, if at all, from those of other common
carriers of passengers and goods, whether private individuals or
copartnership or incorporatet bodies. All common carriers are
bound to receive and carry when paid or tendered a reasonable
compensation. The public use and convenience is the same with
one class of common carriers as with another-the same with an
incorporated stage-coach or steamboat company as with a railroad
company, and yet no one, we think, would pretend that taxation
could be resorted to for the purpose of aiding the former, while all
the property, gains and-emoluments, belong to the individual stockholders. All private corporations are more or less for public use.
If they were considered of no public utility or advantage it is presumed they would never be chartered. It enters into the very definition of a private corporation, that is given in Bonaparte v. The
Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, 1 Bald. C. C. 223, that they
are for the public use and convenience. Mr. Justice BALDWIN says:
"Private corporations are for banks, insurance, roads, canals,
bridges, etc., where the stock is owned by individuals, but theiruse
may be public." And Messrs. Angell and Ames, section 31, after
quoting this language add: "In all the last-named, and other like
corporations, the acts done by them are done with a view to their
own-interest, and if thereby they incidententally promote that of the
public, it cannot be reasonably supposed they do it from any spirit of
liberality they have beyond that of their fellow-citizens. Both the
property and sole object of every such corporationare essentially
private, and from them the individuals composing the company corporate are to derive profit."
But a railroad company, like a company for running stage-coaches
or steamboats, might be incorporated, and the road built, equipped
and operated, the public use and convenience being the same, without the delegation of the power of eminent domain. Money will
secure the title to land over which to build a road by contract with
the owners, and it is a matter of -policy, on the part of the State
whether it will delegate the power of eminent domain or not. If a
road were built and operated by such a company, could money be
raised by taxation for the purpose of giving it to the company ? Or
if a railroad were built by one or more individuals, without any act
of incorporation, and without the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, as it is conceived might be done, could the people be taxed
in order to give the money to such individual or individuals ? Can
a railroad be built and put in running order by direct taxation, and
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then the whole property transferred by act of the legislature, with.out compensation or equivalent, to one ormoreprivateindividuals,
or to a corporation composed of such individuals, created for the
purpose of receiving it? Or can a corporation, composed of one or
more individuals, be created for the purpose of owning and operating a railroad, and holding and enjoying all its gains and emoluments, and at the same time the charter provide that the corporators or stockholders shall pay nothing, but that the road shall be
built, equipped and put in running order at the expense of the people, to be defrayed by taxation? We believe that the legislature
does not possess these powers, and that these questions must be
answered in the negative.
Such proceedings, provided they were proper or could be sustained, would deserve the opprobrious epithet given to them by
Judge JAMES, in Sweet v. Hurlbert, 51 Barb. 316, where, speak-

ing of an Act of the legislature of New York precisely like that
involved in these appeals, says: "If this can be done, it is legal
robbery; less respectable than highway robbery, in this, that the
perpetrator of the latter assumes the danger and infamy of the act,
while this act has the shield of legislative responsibility."
If, as we have supposed, the granting of the right of eminent
domain to a railroad company, may so far change its corporate
character as to clothe it with the power of the State, in consideration of the emoluments allowed to its members, charge it with the
performance of a duty of the State, namely: that of providingsuitable and proper thoroughfares through it for the benefit and convenience of the people, we have still endeavored to show that the
character of the company remains in every other respect the same
as if no such grant had been made. Nor is the mixed public and
private character of the company anything strange or anomalous
in the law of corporations. It is well known, for example, that a
State may take upon itself the character of a private citizen or corporation, by becoming a partner or stockholder in a private trading company or corporation, and that public or municipal corporations may stand in respect to some things, as grants made to them
by the State or under its authority, on the same footing as would
any individual or private corporation, upon whom a like special franchise may have been conferred: Angell and Ames on Corp., s. 31
32, 33, and cases cited. Our conclusion, therefore, is, that though
arailroad company may possess this single exceptional characteristic
it is, nevertheless, essentially a private corporation, coming fully
within the operations of the principles laid down in Curtisv. Whip.
ple, and that the taxation complained of cannot be sustained. This
conclusion is fully supported by the case of Hansen v. Vernon, as
yet unreported, in the Supreme Court of Iowa, December term,
1868, and the case of Sweet v. Hurlbert,above referred to, which are
the only cases known to us where the questions here presented has
been directly raised and decided by the courts. The opinions in both
cases are very able, and clearly and fully su .tain the position taken
by counsel in the able arguments made at the bar in this case.
It only remains for us to add afev words, if indeed the saiae can
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be tought necessary, by the way of distinguishing between this and
those numerous cases where it has been held that cities, towns and
counties can subscribe for the stock in arailroad company, and discharge the debt thus incurred by the assessment and levy of taxes.
The principle upon which such taxation has been sustained will
readily appear by a reference to the opinion in Curtis v. Whipple.
The city, town or county becomes a part owner of the road to the
extent of the stock taken, and the work being one in which the public might have engaged as a sole owner and paid for entirely out of
the public funds, it has been considered that there was no valid
objection to its becoming a part owner thereof as a stockholder in
a private corporation, which has undertaken to do the same woik.
To the extent of the stock taken, the city, town or county is directly
interested and benefited by the money expended in the work, the
same being a matter of public concern, and it is, in our judgment,
upon this principle and this alone that the taxation in thatclass of
cases can be sustained. In saying this of course we do not intend
to exclude the idea found in all the cases, that the road mustbe one
situated within or passing through the corporated limits of the
municipality to be taxed, and so promoting the general prosperity
and welfare of the people who are to pay the taxes: Cooley, Const.
Limitations, 214, and cases cited. The two things must unquestionably concur in order to sustain the tax, but the last, alone, which
may be termed the benefit incidentally arising to the public, is
clearly insufficient for that purpose. The property in the road
having by the creation of the corporation and the franchises granted
to it, been converted into private property devoted exclusively to
the gains and emoluments of the individual stockholders, the incidental benefits accruing to the public by reason of the investment
can no more sustain a tax than the like incidental benefits arising
to the public from the employment of the capital or labor of the
citizens in any other business or enterprise of apurely private character. For if such incidental public benefits or advantages alone
will support a tax for a donation of money to persons or corporaations engaged in one kind of private business, then they certainly
must in another, and if it should be shown, asit undoubtedly can,
in numerous towns and places, that the establishment of mills and
manufactories would be greatly beneficial to the inhabitants, far
more so, perhaps, than the building of a railroad, then it would
follow that the people of such towns and places could be taxed for
the purpose of giving the money to persons or corporations proposing to build such mills or manufactories. This last is a proposition upon which no one will insist, and we are clearly convinced
that that contended for in this case is equally untenable.
A rehearing having been granted, and the case having been very
elaborately argued, the opinion of the court was again delivered by
DIXoN, 0. J.-[After some preliminary observations on the
range of the argument made by counsel.]
First, as to the cases in this court, from the opinions in which
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counsel quote so largely, and upon which they rely so confidently,
it spems hardly necessary to add to our former remarks. Those
cases are clearly distinguishable from this as ever one case was
from another. They are all cases of taxation for the direct and
immediate benefit of the public-to improve a harbor, which was
public property-to save from destruction the streets and site of a
populous town, also public property-and to secure soldiers to protect and defend the country in time of war, always recognized as a
public object of the greatest magnitude and importance. With
these objects in view, it seems very strange thatthe language of the
court should be severed entirely from the facts of the case before it,
and the attempt to be made to apply it to a wholly different state
of facts, where the object of the tax is to promote a strictly individual enterprise and add to or enhance the value of merely private
property.
Again itis said that every case in which the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, in behalf of one of these private railroad companies has been upheld, is an authority clear and positive against
the decision now made. The correctness of this conclusion depends
upon the correctness of the premises from which it proceeds. It is
assumed as the foundation that that which is a public use so asto
justify the exercise of the power of eminent domain, is also a public
use, which will, under all circumstances, justify the exercise of the
power of taxation. It is assumed that no difference exists in public
uses, but that all are alike, and that a public use once established
with respectto one of these powers, is necessarily- a public use with
respect to the other. And this we think to be the great mistake
upon this point. It arises from considering two things alike which
are in reality different. It ignores all distinction between different
public uses and the effect which such differences may have in determining the legislative authority. That public uses differ very widely
from each other is a proposition which no one can deny. They differ
in nature and kind, and in the degree or extent of the public enjoyment. There may be various degrees of the same kind of public
use. It may be more extensive and complete in one case than in
another. Certain uses as per se public, such as of public highways, public buildings and the channels of public rivers. Others
have been declared public by the decisions of the courts, as of railroads, turnpike-roads, public ferries, toll-bridges and the like. But
these last have as yet been declared public only with respectto the
power of eminent domain. Now, as there exists this variety and
difference of public uses, the question arises whether in the case of
this railroad company a distinction is to'be taken between a public
use which will authorize the exercise ofthe power of eminent domain
,and one which will justify a resort to the power of taxation to promote the same object. And we think that there is such distinction.
These powers are not identical, though both must be exercised for
a public purpose or not at all. There are many public uses for
which taxes maybe levied that have not as yet been held to authorize the condemnation of private property, though suitable or convenient for the same public uses. Taxes may be levied to build a
VoL. XVIII.-11
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State capitol, court-house, public school buildings, jails, a State
prison, an asylum for the insane, etc., but recourse to the power of
eminent domtdn to obtain the land upon which to erect such buildings would be something new in the legislative and judicial proceedings of this country. "Who ever heard," says WOODEURY, J., in
West River Bridge Company v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 546, "of laws
to condemn private property for public use for a marine hospital or
State prison ? So a custom-house is a public use for the general
government, and a court-house or jail for a State. But it would be
difficult to find precedent or argument to justify taking private property, without consent, to erect them on, though appropriate for the
purpose." But it may be said that this difference only exists by
reason of the greater public necessity required to justify the exercise "
of the power of eminent domain, and that it shows that the power
of taxation is the more general and extensive ofthe two. Beit so. We
only refer to it for the purpose of showing that such difference does
or may exist in particular cases, and when that is shown, the fact
that there may be other differences in other cases, and which may
lead to other conclusions, seems altogether less improbable. As has
already been said, we think there exists a difference here, and that
it is such that, though the power of eminent domain may be
exercised, yet the power of taxation, as here claimed, cannot be.
And in order to understand this, it will be necessary to precisely
ascertain and define the nature and extent of that public use which,
in the case of these private railroad companies, has been held
sufficient to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain
in their behalf. And first let us rid the question of some considerations which, for want of proper care and attention, have too often
been most erroneously supposed to enter into it. Of such considerations, the principal and most important one is that the public
use which justifies the exercise of the power, in some way consists
in the general benefits and advantages accruing to the public at
large from the creation and operation of these works of internal
improvement. It is very clear that the public use does not in any
manner consist of these, for if it did, then every enterprise of business prosecuted for private gain or emolument, and by whiab the
public prosperity and welfare is also promoted, would be a public
use, and, as such, would justify the exercise of the power of eminent
domain in behalf of the persons and corporations so engaged, and,
according to the doctrine of those who differ from us in opinion,
likewise the power of taxation,.to donate money and property to
such persons, and corporations. There are very many enterprises
and occupations of a private character connected with trade, commerce and manufactures, which are quite as much to our advantage
as a people, and quite as necessary and indispensable to our growth
and prosperity as a nation, as the building and operating of railroads, and some are even more so. Senator MAISON, in that, part
of his opinion quoted by counsel in support of this motion, after
dilating upon the great public advantages afforded by the introduction of railroads, says: "Nextto the moral leverpower of the press,
should be ranked the beneficial influence of railroads in their effectv
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upon the vast and increasing business relatibns of the nation, and
for promoting, sustaining and perpetuating the happiness, prosperity and liberty of the people: 11Bloodgood v. M. &H. R?. B. Co.,
18 Wend. 48. Here then we have, in the leading authority cited
and relied upon by the learned counsel, the admission, the truth of
which no one can dispute, that there arc private business occupations
in which the people at large are more deeply interested and by
which they are more greatly benefited than by the building and
operating of railroads ; and if the benefits and advantages accruing
to the public from the latter, while in the hands of private corporations, and used and operated for the sole gain and emolument of
the stockholders, constitute a public use which will justify a resort
to the powr of taxation for the sake of giving the money to such
corporations, who shall say that the benefits and advantages derived
by the public from the former will not sustain the same proceedings
in order to donate the funds to the persons or corporations whose
time and capital are thus beneficially employed therein? Who
shall say that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
and taxes levied for the encouragement and support of the newspaper and periodical press of the country? Who shall say that
donations and benevolences drawn from the pockets of the people
by taxation may be given to the champions of the New York and
Erie Railroad, and that they may not be given to the Harpers or
the Appletons? Who shall set Franklin Square against Wall
street, and claim that taxes may be levied to give to the latter bat
not to the former? The majority of this court has decided that
upon considerations like these, taxation cannot be resorted to for
either purpose, and to that decision it is proposed to adhere until
some more satisfactory ground for discrimination can be shown
than has yet been made to appear. It is obvious if public benefits and advantages of this kind, and which may be properly called
incidental, constitute a public use which will justify a resort to
either of these sovereign powers of government, that then all distinction between public and private business, and public and private purposes, is obliterated, and the door to taxation is opened
wide for every conceivable object, by which the public interest and
welfare may be indirectly or in any wise promoted. Such a doctrine would be subversive of all just'ideas of the powers of government, and destructive of all rights of private property, leaving
every man's estate to be held by him as a mere grace or favor received at the hands of the legislative body. And such is the consequence of looking to these incidental.public benefits and advantages as the public use, which will justify the exercise of these
high governmental powers; andthose gentlemen, who, like Senator
MATsox and others, have in words of studied eloquence labored to
,depict such benefits and advantages, thinking that they were
thereby demonstrating that such legislation was justifiable, were
never more mistaken. The same eulogies might, and with equal
or more truth, be applied to the press, to domestic manufacturrs
and to many other things, by which the general happiness and
,prosperity of the people have been equally or more greatly pro.
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moted. The incidental public benefits or advantages, though in a
general sense to be considered, do not, therefore, constitute in thE,
sense of the law a public use, which will justify the interference
of the government, and the question is in what does such use consist
in the case of these railroads owned and operated by private corporations? We have seen that certain uses are per se public and
that others have been pronounced so by the courts, and among the
latter railroads. Eminent domain is the right of the government
to seize private property for public use, upon payment of just cornpensation to the owner. It is a power which must be exercised by
the government or sovereign, and for the public use only. It cannot be delegated. "1The public use," says Judge COOLEY, in his
excellent Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 53, " implies a
possession, occupation and enjoyment of the land by the public,
or public agencies." And further on, in commenting upon the
same subject, he notices the broad language of Chancellor WAWORTH, in Beekrnan v. Saratoga& Schenectady 1B. B. Co., 3 Paige
73, and which is quoted and made emphatic by counsel here, that
"if the public interest can be in any way promoted by the taking
of private property," the taking can be considered for a public use.
Judge CooLEY observes what must be obvious to every one who
has thoroughly considered the subject, that it would not be safe to
apply with much liberality this language of the learned chancellor.
We refer to this definition of the learned writer, as being the most
clear, concise and correct general definition of what constitutes the
public use, which justifies-the exercise of power of eminent domain
that has anywhere fallen under observation. It appears then that
the public use consists in the possession, occupation and enjoyment of the land itself by the public, or public agencies,and not in
any incidental benefits or advantages which may accrue to the
public from enterprises of this nature. But the question before
us calls for a more precise definition as to how it is that the public
may be said to possess, occupy and enjoy the land condemned for the
use of these railroad companies. And here again we must refer to
the opinion of Mr. Justice WOODBURY, whose clear ideas and firm
grasp of legal truths seem never once to have forsaken him. In
the case first above cited, after speaking- of certain uses which
could not be deemed public so as to justify the application of the
principle of eminent domain, and specifying some of those things
which are necessary to constitute a public use of a toll-bridge, turnpike, or railroad, he says, in addition that it "must be underpublic
regulations as to tolls, or owned, or subject to be owned by the State,
in order to make the corporation and object public, for a purpose like
this." And as was customary with him, he cites many authorities to
the point, and then proceeds: "It is not enough that there is an act
of corporation for a bridge, or turnpike, or railroad, to make them
public, so as to be able to take private property constitutionally,
without the owner's consent; but their uses and objects, or interests
must be what has just been indicated-must in their essence, and
character, and liabilities be public within the meaning of the term
'public use.' There may be a private bridge as well as a private road
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or private railroad, and this with or without an act ofincorporation."5
And Chancellor WALwoRTa, in Beekman v. SaratogaB. B. Co., 3
Paige 75, likewise states the true nature of the public use when he
puts it on the ground that "the legislature may from time to time
regulate the use of the franchisean-/ limit the amount of toll which
it shallbe lawful to take, in the same manner as they may regulate
the amount of tolls to be taken at a ferry or for grinding at a mill,
unless they have deprived themselves of that power by a legislative
contract with the owners of the road." And in the leading case of
Railroad Co. v. Chappell, 1 Rice 398, cited by Judge WOODBURY
and likewise by counsel here, it is said that a railroad to be deemed
a highway should be kept under public control. The public use
therefore, which has been held to justify the application of the doctrine of eminent domain in the case of these railroads owned and
operated by private individuals, consists in the fact that the owners
cannot, without reasonable excuse, refuse to receive and transport
passengers and freight when offered at usual rates, and in the
fact that the State retains thepower to regulateand controlthefranchise and limit the amount of tolls which it shall be lawful for the
owners to charge. The use consists in these facts and these alone.
And as a man may be said topossess and enjoy the estate ofanother,
the use of which by that other he may regulate and control so that
it shall not to be turned to his detriment or disadvantage, sothe public, through this reserved power of the State, may be said to possess
and enjoy the land condemned for use by these railroad companies.
And this is the public use which has been held to justify the exercise
of the power of eminent domain in behalf of such corporations, apower which, by the barrier erected by the Constitution requiringpayment of full compensation to the owner, is far less susceptible of legislative abuse andfar less dangerous to private right than thepower
of taxation. And here it occurs to us to observe that under the
principles announced in the Dartmouth College case, and in the
numerous cases which have followed it in the same court, and by
the authority of which the courts of all the States are bound, this
power of the State to regulate and control the franchise and fix the
amount of the tolls, and without which the pubjic use cannot exist,
has frequently been wholly lost. The doctrine of these cases that
the charters of such corporations are contracts between the State
and the corporators or stockholders, and, as such, irrevocable and
unchangeable at the will of the legislative body which granted them
unless the power to alter or repeal is expressly reserved, overturns
entirely the principle upon which the power of eminent domain ha
often been exercised in behalf of corporations thus chartered and
organized. It is totally inconsistent with the ground upon which
.that principle has been held to apply, that the power and control
of the State, and consequent public use, should be thus extinguished; or that such power and control should be exhausted by
the legislature having regulated the toll or fixed the rates for carriage and transporation in the first instance ; or that it should be
competent for the legislature in any manner or by any contract
with the corporation for its promoters or stockholders to part
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with its authority in the premises. A corporation of this kind,
which is above the power and control of the State in these
particulars, is not for the public use so as to justify the exercise of eminent domain in its behalf; and it appears to us that,
as to every act of incorporation thus falling within the deci
sions of the Federal Supreme Court, it should have been so held
It appears to us also in the passage above quoted, that Chancellor
WALWORTH, eminent as he was for sound learning and judicial
ability, was inconsistent in putting the public use which would
authorize the application of the principle of eminent domain upon
the ground that the legislature might "from time to time regulate
the use of the franchise and limit tl]e amount of toll which it should
be allowed to take," and then in admitting or supposing that the
legislature might, by contract with the railroad company, deprive
itself of that power. But be this matter as it may in other States,
the question can never arise in this State. Our people, by a most
wise provision in their Constitution, have perpetually reserved the
power to the legislature to alter or repeal all charters or acts of
incorporation at any time after their passage: Const. Art. XI., Sec.
I. In this State, therefore, the public have that use which has been
held to justify the exercise of the power. The legislature, if it has
not, may limit the tolls and fares to be received by this railroad
company to a reasonable sum, beyond which the company shall not
go. It may prevent abuses in that respect. And now that we see
precisely what this publi( use is, its character and extent, we are
the better able to judge whether it will sustain the power of taxation here claimed. We see that it is not a public useper se, which
all agree will support taxation, but far from it. It is not that free
and unrestrained use which the public has of its own property, but
a mere right, on the part of the public, through the legislature,
to control the franchise of the company, and regulate its use of the
property belonging to it. so as to prevent oppression and avoid the
imposition of unreasonable and unjust burdens upon the people who
are obliged to avail them selves of these great channels of trade and
communication. In The IVest River Bridge Company v. Dix,above
cited, a critical examination into the nature and extent of this public use became necessary, and the subject was most thoroughly.and
exhaustively canvassed and considered. The legislature of Vermont, conceiving that it might sometime be expedient to convert
the turnpike roads and toll-bridges in that State into free roads and
free bridges, passed an act authorizing the Supreme and county
courts to take any real estate, easement, or franchise, of any turnpike or other corporation, when, in their judgment, the public good
required a public highway, and providing that compensation should
he made in same manner as in the case of highways laid out over
individual or private property.

Under that act the franchise and

property ofthe West River Bridge Company, a corporation created
by the laws of that State, and whose charter had some sixty years
to run, were seized for public use. The company resisted the pro.
ceedings on various grounds, all of which were overruled. The cause
was argued for the company Ly Mr. Colinier and Mr. Webster,
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and on the other side by Mr. Phelps, the two latter being at that
time Senators of the United States. One objection urged against
the proceeding was that the property was already devoted to the
public use, and that there could be no such thing as seizing it again
for a public use of the very same kind. In reply to this Mr. Phelps
said (and we feel no hesitancy in quoting the language of so distinguished a lawyer, judge and statesman, though used in argument,
especially when such argument was fully sustained by the decision
of the court), speaking of the power of eminent domain: "But the
question has been agitated elsewhere and may be started here,
whether a franchise granted to private persons for their private
emolument, and yet for a public use, is not beyond the reach of
that power. These cases beingofa mixed character,combining private right and emolument with public convenience, the question
resolves itself into two others, viz. : Ist. Are the private rights
thus conferred of any superior sanctity? And, 2d. Does the partial,
qualified and limited appropriationof the property to public use
exclude the further exercise of the right of eminent domain ?"
And Mr. Justice McLEAN said: "The use of this bridge, it is contended, is the same as before the act of appropriation. The public
use the bridge now as before the act of appropriation. But it
was a toll-bridge, an'I by the act it is made free. The use, therefore,
is not the same. The tax assessed on the citizens of the town to keep
up and pay for the bridge may be impolitic or unjust; but thatis
not a matter for the consideration of the court." These references
show very clearly the difference existing in public uses, and that the
.public use in the case of a railroad owned and operated by a private corporation is but a partial, qualified and limited one. It. is
qualified and limited by the private right which the railroad company has to ask and demand of every person who uses its road a
reasonable fee or toll which may be fixed by act of the legislature.
And in the case of the toll-bridge which was made free by right of
eminent domain, the taxes which the people paid to compensate the
company for the franchise and property taken from it, beclnie a
substitute for the tolls which had been theretofore paid. Before the
act of appropriation the public could use the bridge only upon paying tribute to the company, but afterward it was free. The proposition here is to compel the public to pay tribute and taxes tooto pay for the property and yet not to own it--topayfor it and yet
pay the company for the privilege of using it. Is there to be no
discrimination upondifferentpublic uses for these different purposes?
Is the partial,qualified and limited public use which has been held
sufficient to justify the exercise of the power of eminent domain in
behalf of these private railroad companies, also to be held sufficient
to justify the exercise of the power of taxation for the sole and
immediate purpose of donating the moneys raised to such companies ? If it is, then indeed are the proper objects of taxation
greatly multiplied. The power of the legislature to regulate the
tolls and charges of such companies is in itself a limited-one, if not
in a constitutional sense, certainly in the sense of morality and
justice. If there be not an express, there is certainly an implied

168

WHITING V.

SHEBOYGAN RAILWAY COMPANY

obligation and promise on the part of the State, never to reduce the
tolls and charges below a standard which will be reasonable, or
which will afford a fair and adequate remuneration and return upon
the amount of capital actually invested. This obligation and
promise, which spring from the act of incorporation and invitation
by the State to persons to invest theirmoney in the stock, it ispresumed no legislative body would disregard, except where the company by gross and wanton abuse of its privileges bad forfeited its
rights, and then instead of legislative action, it is also presumed
that the regular course of judicial proceedings would ordinarily be
preferred. The true intent and object of the power is that the
legislature shall be able to protect the rights and interest of the
people, but not that it shall arbitrarily or unnecessarily impair the
rights or franchises of the company or destroy the property of its
stockholders. The good faith of the State is pledged against this,
and it is not within the range of presumption that it will ever be
done. The individuals owning the property and whom the corporation represents, purchase it under this pledge and inducement
held out by the State. To them it is a matter of mere private
business, engaged in under the sanction and encouragement of the
State, and for their individual gain and emolument, and the legislature will no more unnecessarily interfere with it, or with the
business of the corporation where it is legitimately and properly
conducted, than it wfll with any other private business. As yet
we believe the power has never been exercised with respect to any
railroad company organized in this State, and possibly it may never
be. It is valuable, however, as a check upon the rapacity which
these corporations sometimes exhibit, and the time may come when
the legislature will be imperatively required to exert it, but when
it does, if ever, it will not be to deprive the corporation or its
stockholders of their legitimate rights, but to correct abuses and
save the rights of the people. The legislature will not reduce the
tolls qr rates to an unreasonably low figure, or so as to disappoint
the just expectations of the owners of stock. It will not destroy
the earnings of the road or cut off satisfactory dividends upon the
cash capital actually paid in, if the business of the company is
such as to afford them. In fine, it will hold the company only to
the receipt of reasonabletolls, and this with a view to the nature
and extent of its business, the expenses necessarily incurred by
it, and the amount of capital invested. The legislature will
not put down the tolls unreasonably with a view to compensating the loss of the company by taxing the community at large,
for that would be to defeat the very principle upon which all
these companies are organized and roads built. That principle
is that those persons should pay for the building and operating
of the roads who use them and as they use them. They pay their
taxes for these improvements when they pay their tolls. Regarding the reserved power in this light, and as it in fact exists
and will continue to exist, and considering that it constitutes the
only legitimate basis of any public use which will justify the exercise of the power of taxation here contended for, we see at once, if
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the power be conceded, that there are other private business pursuits fo the benefit of which, or of the persons engaged in them,
taxes may also be levied. All common carriers of passengers and
goods are bound to receive and carry, unless some valid excuse be
shown, when tendered areasonablecompensation. This is the right
of the people at large-of all. It is compulsory by them, and not
optional with the carrier: Angell on Carriers, §§ 124 to 129, and
authorities cited. If this tax be valid, why may not the people be
taxed to make donations to common carriers? And as innkeepers stand upon the same footing with respect to the rights of the
public and the sums they may charge for entertainment, why may
not taxes be levied for their benefit? But it may be said that the
legislature has not the power to fix the sums which carriers shall
charge. This is by no means certain. But if not to tax for common carriers, then certainly the power would exist to tax for the
benefit of all owners of grist-mills throughout the country. In the
case of a grist-mill, the private property of any person, there exists
the same public use as in the case of a railroad. It differs from it
in no respect whatever. The legislature may regulate and limit the
tolls for grinding at its pleasure, and provide, as the legislature of
this State has done, that the owner shall receive and grind the grists
of others in preference to grinding his own grain. Laws of this
character exist in every State of the Union, as well in those where
it has been held that the right of eminent domain cannot be exercised in behalf of mill owners as in those where it has been held
that it can. And in this State it is immaterial whether the head or
power of water which propels the mill is created by flowing the
lands of others under the authority granted by the Mill Dam Act,
or only by flowing the land belonging to the owner of the mill.
The Act applies to and regulates the tolls and manner of conducting
the business in all grist-mills moved by water: R. S. Ch. 60. When,
therefore, the owner of a site and adequate mill-power upon his own
land becomes desirious of improving it by the erection of a grist-mill,
he might apply to the legislature for an act to tax his neighbors to
furnish funds for that purpose, and such act would be valid; or,
having erected his dam and built and put his mill in operation, he
might, from time to time, afterward procure such taxation for his
private or individual benefit, and no lawful objection could be taken
thereto. For ourselves, we cannot think that this kind of public
use, though it may sustain the power of eminent domain, will also
sustain taxation like this, and we here end our remarks upon the
point.
Again, it is said that the property in the hands of these railroad
companies, is public property, and therefore such taxation is justifi4ble. This proposition requires not much discussion. The contrary
has been the settled law, both in England and this country, ever
since these and kindred corporations, as plank-road companies
turnpike companies, toll-bridge companies, ferry companies an I
the like, have had an existence, and for the earlier authorities to
this point we refer to the citations in the brief of cauns-el in Charle,
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters 13,. N)toalyt!epzi-

170

WHITING V. SHEBOYGAN RAILWAY COMPANY.

perty in the road, rolling stock, fixtures and all buildings and
appurtenances, is recognized and protected as the private property of
the corporation, but also the franchise itself. It is subject to mortgage lease and sale by the company, and may be seized and sold
on execution against it. And, if it belongvd to a natural persolt,
it might also be bequeathed or disposed of by will. " A franchise,"
says Mr. Justice DANIEL, delivering the opinion of the court in
The West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, supra, "is property and nothing
more; it is incorporeal property, and so defined by BLACKSTONE,
volume 2, p. 20. It isits character of property only which imparts
to it value, and alone authorizes in individuals a right of action for
invasions or disturbances of its enjoyment." And Mr. Justice
M LEAN says in the same case: "It is objected that this bridge,
being owned by a corporationand used by the public,does not come
within the designationof privateproperty. All property, whether
owned by an individualorindividuals, a corporationaggregateor
sole, is within the term. In short, all propertynotpublicisprivate."
And, in the same case, Mr. Justice WOODBURY, speaking of the franchise, says: "It is also property, subject to be sold, sometimes even
on execution, and may be devised or inherited." And further on
he adds: "I concur, therefore, in the further views, that the corporation is a franchise, and all its powers are franchises, both being
property,may for these anid like reasonsinpropercases be taken for
public ue for a highway." And in Thorpe v. B. & B. B. Company,
27 Vt. 151, Chief Justice REDFI ELD, in pronouncing the judgment
of the court, says: "It is admitted that the essential franchise of a
private corporation is recognized by the best authority as private
property, and cannot be taken without compensation, even for public use." And on page 155, speaking of the case of Swan v. Wil.
liamson, 2 Mich. 427, where it was denied that railways were pri.
vate corporations, he says: "But that proposition is scarcely
maintainable so far as the pecuniary interest is concerned. If the
stock is owned by private persons, the corporation is private so far
as the right of legislative control is concerned, however public the
functions devolved upon it may be." To these authorities many
others might be added, but it is deemed unnecessary. And the
force of the language quoted and emphasized by counsel from the
opinion of Chief Justice SHAW, in Inhabitantsof Worcester v. The
Western Railroad Corporation,4 Met. 566, to the effect that the
real and personal property there vested in the corporation,was "in
trust for the public," consists in concealing or losing sight of the

facts of that particular case. The.act of incorporation there was
peculiar, and it appears in the very next paragraph of the opinion
how that trust was created. And the doctrine of the isolated case
of Erie and Northeast Railroad Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. R. 287, by
a divided court, that after the repeal of the charter of a railroad
company the property belonging to the corporation is public property, and that the State may take possession of and hold it regardless of the rights of stockholders and of the creditors of the company, is so clearly in opposition to every other adjudication' upon
the subject that it seems almost a waste of time to talk about it.
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* * * It would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, to hold that the obli.
gation of the contracts of such corporation could be impaired by
the repeal of their charters. "The obligation of those contracts
survives; and the creditors may enforce their claims against any
property belonging to the corporation, which has not passed into
the hands of buna fide purchasers, but is held in trust for the company or for the stockholders thereof, at the time of its dissolution
in any mode permitted by the local laws:" Mumma v. The Potomac Company, 3 Pet. 286. See also Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304, and cases cited.
A further argument in support of the power is that a writ of
mandamus will lie a*t the instance of the State to compel the company to build and operate its road, and that when the public have
such an interest taxes may be levied. This seems to be a consideration of some importance; but unfortunately for the argument.
the English case cited and relied upon by counsel has been overruled, and it is now held in E ngland under charters very much
more specific and stringent than any granted in this country, that
there exists no obligation on the part of the company, either before
or after entering upon the work, to complete it: 18 Eng. L. and
Eq. R. 199, 211; 2 Redfield on Railways, § 192 and note 5. And
iu the case of The People v. A. and V. B. B. Co., 24 N. Y. 261,
it was held that no injunction could be granted at the suit of the
people to prevent a railroad company from abandoning a portion
of its road and removing the track; and although it was intimated
that mandamus or indictment would lie, yet the whole reasoning
of the court was against it. The writ has never yetbeen sustained
in any case in this country, and Judge REDFIELD says inthe note
above referred to that the latter English decisions "certainly conform to what has ever been regarded as the law upon that subject
in this country." * * * After the people of Fond du Lac
county have levied this money there is nothing in the act of incorporation or in that for imposing this tax to bind the company
even to run a single car over the road, or prevent itfrom taking
up the track and abandoning the use of the road entirely.
Another, and the last point, is upon thie authority of those decisions in which it has been held that municipal corporations, when
authorized, may become subscribers to the stock of these railroad
companies. It has been said that to discriminate between cases
where stock has been subscribed for and those where it has not,
but the money is to be given to the company, is "to dwarf and
obsure the real nature of these works, and unduly to magnify into the place of principal, a feature which was merely casual, incidental and comparatively unimportant." Whether this appears
so or not depends very much upon what our attention is given to.
If we are looking to the rules and principles of law governing the
subject, there would seem to be very good ground for the discrimination. To the extent of the stock subscribed the municipality
owns the road, and it may be said to be public property. We have
seen that whether the public own the property, enters very materi-
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ally into the consideration of the question, whether the purpose ir
public or not. We all know, too, that the position of one who
gives ds a gratuity to a corporation is very different from that of
a stockholder in it. The stockholder has certain equitable rights,
which he may enforce, while the giver of the gratuity has none,
The stockholder may insist upon the strict application of his money
to the legitimate purposes of the corporation. He may restrain
the directors and officers from squandering and misapplying it, and
compel the company to use its funds in building and operating the
road, according to the true intent of his subscription. He who
gives money to the company, can exercise no such rights. And
esides all these, the correctness of this line of decisions, upholding
.municipal subscriptions to the stock of railroad companies, has been
questioned by very high authority. Judge REDFIELD says: " For
ourselves we are free to confess that we never could comprehend
the basis upon which so many able jurists in this country have professed to perceive clearly the reasons for giving municipal corporations the power to become stockholders in railway companies. We
have alvays felt that it was one of those cases in jurisprudence
where the wish was father to the thought: "12 Redfield on Railways,
sec. 230, note 1. Certainly the consequences of upholding such subscriptions have been most sad and disastrous-to many cities, towas
and counties throughout the country; and it is obvious from the
tenor of Judge COoLEY's remarks, that the doctrine does not meet
his approbation: Coast. Lim. 213,214. Shall decisions thus doubted
and questioned be held to justify or compel a further step in the
same direction ? We thiak not, and are prepared to say, with
Judge SHARSW0oo and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the
special street taxation case in Philadelphia: "Thus far shalt thou
go, and no further:" Hammett v. City of Philadelphia,8 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 422. Motion denied.
COLE, J.-I

concur fully in the opinion of the Chief Justice.

PAINE, J., dissented.
Since (as 31r. Justice WOoDWAuD
observed in .Philadelphiav. Tyson, 35
Pa. St. 401, 404), "every man holds
his property subject to the taxing
power" of the State, what question is
of moremomeutto the propertyowner
than the one, what is taxation, and
for what purposes may property be lawfully taxed ?
The transcendent importance, theoretical and practical, of the principles
involved in the foregoing opinions, as
well as the vigorous and close intelleotual grasp with which these princi.

plesarediscussedmake these opimon3
well worthy of attention. The questions are entirely modern. The extent
to which legislation, similar to that
which was drawn in question In the
main case, prevaiq, particularly in
the west, and the earnestness with
which it is contended, on the one side,
that such laws are not objectionable
on legal principles and are salutary
in their results, and on the other side,
that they are palpable and oppressive
invasions of the property-rights of the
citizen and disastrous in their opera-
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tion, Invest discussions of this character with an absorbing interest.
Under an existing law of this character, in. the State of Illinois, it is estimated, that within two or three years
past, an indebtedness on the part of
townships and towns has already
been incurred of many millions of
dollars, and the amount is so constantly and rapidly increasing, that
thoughtfal citizens are alarmed, and
the subject is arresting the consideration of the Constitutional Convention
of that State, now in session.
Respecting the policy of such legislation, we do not propose to offer any
observations. It is the validiy of
such laws that mainly concerns the
jurist.
Adverting to the principal, case, it
may be remarked, that the burden of
the defendant's argument for a rehearing was, that the taxes authorized by
law under consideration are for a
purpose (and hence the law is public
valid), because the right of eminent
domain can be exercised in favor of
such companies, and the property of
the citizen compulsorily taken for the
right of way, although the Constitution
In terms prohibits such taking of any
other than a public use. The point
I-, that if, when property is taken for
tne right of way, the use is public, as
all aamit, so the use is public when
money is taken from the citizen with
which to aid the corporation to build
the road.
Those who deny the soundness,
must admit the plausibility of this
argument.
The opinion of Chief Justice Dixow
gn thp motion fora rehearing.is especially valuable for its treatment of thedifference in the nature of the two
poers of taxation and eminent
d1omain.
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In this note we will restrict ourselves to a brief notice to a few recent
adjudications, having relation to the
nature and limits to the taxing power.
In Curtis v. Whipple, referred to
in the foregoing opinion, but not yet
reported, the case showed that the
legislature of Wisconsin, in 186
passed an Act, incorporating the Tef.
Jerson Liberal Institute, and authorizing local taxes to be levied and col.
lected for its benefit. This was a private educational institute, owned by
stockholders and controlled by a board
of trustees. The town of Jefferson,
whose people were to be taxed to support it, was not a stockholder and had
no voice in its management. Nor'
were the tax-payers in the town, as
such, stockholders, nor did they have
any special rights or privileges in the
institution. The taxes, when collected,
were to be paid over to the treasurer
of the institute, and the town or its
people bad no control over the mode
of expenditure. Under these circum.
stances the court agreed in holding,
that the Act authorizing the tax was
unconstitutional and void.
The court observed that the fact
that the insitution was incorporated,
did not make it other than a private
school. "Nor," continues the court,
"will the location of the institution
at Jefferson, and the incidental benefitswhich may thereby arise to the
people of the town, sustain the tax.
This is not the kind of public benefit
and interest which will authorize a
resort to the power of taxation." Mr.
Justice PAUNE assented, but with hesitation, saying that he "did so with
very great doubt as to its correctness."
He further remarked: "It must be
conceded by all, that a tax must be
for a public and not a private purpose, and on the whole, although the
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public has a general and indirect
interest in the success of educational
enterprises, he thought the tax could
not be sustained. The case was distinguished from Merrick v. Amherst.
11 Allen 500, in which the validity
of a law authorizing the people of
Amherst to be taxed in aid of the
Agricultural College there located,
was upheld.
In Hansen . Vernon, not yet reported, but which will appear in 27
Iowa Reports, the subject of the validity of direct gifts of money to aid
railway corporations in the construction of their roads, was examined by
the court at great length. That case
involved the validity of the Act of
the Iowa legislature of 186S, which
in substance provides, that If a maJority of voters of any township, city,
or town, shaH, at any special election,
vote in favor of aiding in the construction of any railroad located as
therein specified, a tax shall be levied,
collectable in the same manner as
county taxes, not to exceed five per
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road by reason of such payment, over
and beyond the non-taxpayer or any
other citizen of the State.
The court decided against the valid.
ity of the Act: holding
1. That taxation for private par.
poses is unconstitutional, and that a
statute whichauthorizessuchtaxation
is void, l)ceause it seeks to deprive a
citizen of his property I without due
process of law," contrary to the bill 0
rights.
2. That whether the specific use foi
which a staute proposes to take the
property of a citizen, be public or pri
ve, is a judicial question, concerning
which, the determination of the legis.
lature, while entitled to great respect
is not conclusive; and the court held,
that the money required by thie Act
was not a tax (which necessarily involves the idea of a public purpose)
but an illegal exaction under the
mre and guise of a tax.
The court observe "that they can.

not uphold the tax in question with.
pitci
the follon
ot saoctin
out sanctioning the following princi.
cent. upon the assessed value of the ple, viz.: That it is competent for the
property in the township, city or town. legislature, because of the Incidental
This tax, when collected, formed no advantages which will result to the
part of the public revenue, but was to community from the carrying out of
be paid over to the proper railroad the object of a volunteer private rail.
company, as provided In the Act. That way corporation, organized for pecuthe tax belonged wholly to the railroad nary profit, to authorize a tax to be
company was obvious from the provision in the Act which allowed the taxpayer to pay the amount directly to
the railroad company, whose receipt
should discharge him from the tax.

levied on the citizen and his property,
to be given as a bounty to such private corporation to be used in aid of
its undertaking, without any pecuniary compensation to the tax-payer

The essential feature of the law was
regarded as being that it was a taz
which was sought to be authorized,
and that the proceeds of this tax were
donated'to or given outright to the

being contemplated or furnished, and
that such a doctrine unsettles the oun.
dations of private rights."
So in Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb,
316, an Act of the legislature jropos-

railway companies, without making ing to authorize money to be raised
any direct return therefor to the tax- by taxation and donated to a railroad
payer, who had no interest in the company was held to be void.
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In Xirby v. Shaw, 7 Harris, 258,
ChietJustice Ginsox remarked: "That
as regards taxation there is no limita* "The sum of the
tion of it." *
matter is, that the taxing power must
be left to that part of the government
(the law-making branch) which is to
exercise it."
But this broad language, abdicating
on the part of the courts all control
over the purposes for which taxes
may be laid, has been since expressly
limited in the same state in the recent
case, Hammet v. Philadelphia. 8 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 421.Judge SnAnsWOOD remarks: "There is, indeed, no
clause in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, which restricts the power of
taxation as is to be found in the Constitutions of many of our sister States.
Yet, it must be confessed that there
are necessary limits to it in the very
nature of the subject." And see also
rood, 38
.Philadelphia Association v.
Pa. St., 81; Tyson v. School Direct., 51
Id., 9.
Taking all these cases together they
may be said to settle the principle,
that a statute which authorizes taxes
to be levied for and given to any
mere private corporation or person or
purpose, is illegal; otherwise, if the
purpose may fairly be said to be pub-

lic; and that whether the purpose be
one which it is competent to aid by
taxation is ultimately a judicial ques.
tion, but the courts, while not coneluded by, will pay great respect tO
any expressed and clear opinion of the
legislature on this point. The principal case distinguishes laws, such as
were before the Wisconsin court, aiding roads by direct gifts without any
return of stock, from laws which
authorize municipal and public corporations to subscribe for and own the
stock of railway companies.
Laws of the latter description have
had the sanction of the judgments of
the courts of most of the States; but
the grounds on which they rest have
never been entirely satisfactory to the
profession, and the experience of the
last twenty years has shown that they
have been fruitful of bad results. If the
distinction between the two classes of
law is sound, the weight of authority
may be said to be with the doctrine
of the principal case. But If that distinction cannot be maintained, then
it is at present otherwise, but with an
obvious tendency in the judicial mind
in the direction of the doctrines of the
foregoing opinions.
J. F. D.
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There is in the Constitution no express grant of legislative power to mrke
any description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts.
The words "all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution"
powers expressly granted or vested have, in the Constitution, a sense equivalent to that of the words, laws not absolutely necessary indeed, but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and legitimate ends, which are not pro
hibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution; laws
really calculated to effect objects entrusted to the governul-ut.
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Among the means appropriate, plainly adapted, not inconsistent with the
spirit of the Constitution, nor prohibited by its terms, the legislature has
unrestricted choice; but no power can be derived by implication from any
express power to enact laws as a means for carrying it into execution unless
such laws come within this description.
The making of notes or bills of credit a legal tender in payment of preexisting debts is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted or really calculated
to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; is inconsistent with
the spirit of the Constitution; and is prohibited by the Constitution.
The clause in the Acts of 1862 and 1863, which makes United States notes
a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, is, so far as it applies
to debts contracted before the passage of those acts, unwarranted by the Constitution.

the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WRIT OF ERILORtO

CHASE, C. J.-The question presented for our determination by
the record in this case is whether or not the payee or assignee of a
note, made before the 25th of February, 1862, is obliged by law to
accept in payment United States notes, equal in nominal amount
to the sum due according to its terms, when tendered by the maker
car other party bound to pay it.
And this requires, in the first place, a construction of that clause
of the first section of the Act of Congress passed on that day,
which declares the United States notes, the issue of which was
authorized by the statute, to be a legal tender in payment of debts.
The entire clause is in these words: "And such notes, therein
authorized, shall be receivable in payment of all taxes, internal
duties, excises, debts, and demands of every kind due to the United
States, except duties on imports, and of all claims and demands
against the United States of every kind whatsoever, except for
interest upon bonds and notes, which shall he paid in coin; and
shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all
debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties
on imports and interest as aforesaid:" 12 U. S. St. 345.
This clause has already received much consideration here, and
this court has held that, upon a sound construction, neither taxes
imposed by State legislation-Lane County v. Oregon, I Wall.
71-nor demands upon contracts which stipulate in terms for the
payment or delivery of coin or bullion-Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wall.
229; Butler v. Hl'orwitz, 7 Wall. 258-are included by legislative
intention under the description of debts public and private.
We are now to determine whether this description embraces
debts contracted before as well as after the date of the Act.
It is an established rule 'for the construction of statutes that the
terms employed by the legislature are not to receive an interpretation which conflicts with acknowledged principles of justice and
equity, if another sense, consonant with those principles, can be
given to them.
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But this rule cannot prevail where the intent is clear. Except
in the scarcely supposable case where a statute sets at naught the
plainest precepts of morality and social obligation, courts must give
effect to the clearly ascertained legislative intent, if not repugnant
to the fundamental law ordained in the Constitution.
Applying the rule just stated to the act under consideration, there
appears to be strong reason for construing the word debts as having
reference only to debts contracted subsequent to the enactment of
the law. For no one will question that the United States notes,
which the act makes a legal tender in payment, are essentially
unlike in nature, and, being irredeemable in coin, are necessarily
unlike in value, to the lawful money intended by parties to contracts for the payment of money made before its passage.
The lawful money then in use and made a legal tender in payment consisted of gold and silver coin.
The currency in use under the act, and declared by its terms to
be lawful money and a legal tender, consists of notes or promises
to pay impressed upon paper, prepared in convenient form for circulation, and protected against counterfeiting by suitable devices
and penalties.
The former possess intrinsic value determined by the weight and
fineness of the metal ; the latter have no intrinsic value, but a purchasing value, determined by the quantity in circulation, by general consent to its currency in payments, and by opinion as to the
probability of redemption in coin.
Both derive, in different degrees, a certain additional value from
their adaptation to circulation by the form and impress given to
theni under national authority, and from the acts making them
respectively a legal tender..
Contracts for the payment of money, made before the Act of
1862, had reference to coined money and could not be discharged,
unless by consent, otherwise than bytender of the sum due in coin.
Every such contract, therefore, was, in legal import, a contract for
the payment of coin.
There is a well known law of currency, that notesor promises to
pay, unless made conveniently and promptly convertible into coin
at the will of the holder, can never, except under unusual and abnormal conditions, be at par in circulation with coin.
It is an equally well known law that depreciation of notes must
increase, with the increase of the quantity put in circulation and
the diminution of confidence in the ability or disposition to redeem.
Their appreciation follows the reversal of these conditions. No act
making them a legal tender can changematerially the operation of
these laws.
Their force has been strikingly exemplified in the history of the
United States notes. Beginning with a very slight depreciation
when first issued, in March, 1862, they sank in July, 1864, to the
rate of two dollars and eighty-five cents for a dollar in gold, and
ffhen rose until recently a dollar and twenty cents in paper became
equal to a gold dollar.
Admitting, then, thit prior c:)ntracts are witin the intention of
VOL. XVIII.-
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the act, and assuming that the act is warranted by the Constitution, it follows that the holder of a promissory note, made before the
act, for a thousand dollars, payable, as we have just seen, according to the law ai~d according to the intent of the parties, in coin,
was required, when depreciation reached its lowest point, to accept,
in payment a thousand note dollars, although with the thousand
coin dollars, due under the contract, he could have purchased on
that day two thousand eight hundred and fifty such dollars,
Every payment, since the passage of the act, of a note of earlier
date, has presented similar, though less striking, features.
Now, it certainly needs no argument to prove that an act, compelling acceptance in satisfaction of any other than stipulated payment, alters arbitrarily the terms of the contract and impairs its
obligation, and that the extent of impairment is in the proportion
of the inequality of the payment accepted under the constraint of
the law to the payment due under the contract.
Nor does it need argument to prove that the practical operation
of such an act is contrary tojustice and equity.
It follows that no construction which attributes such practical
operation to an Act of Congress is to be favored, or indeed to be
admitted, if any other can be reconciled with the manifest intent
of the legislature.
What, then, is that manifest intent? Are we at liberty, upon a
fair and reasonable construction of the act, to say that Congress
meant that the word "debts," used in the act, should not include
debts contracted prior to its passage?
In the case of Bronson v. Bodes we thought ourselves warranted
in holding that this word, as used in the statute, does not include
obligations created by express contracts for the payment of gold
and silver, whether coined or in bullion. This conclusion rested,
however, mainly on the terms of the act, which not only allow but
require payments in coin by and to the government, and may be
fairly considered, independently of considerations belonging to the
law of contracts for the delivery of specified articles, as sanctioning
special private contracts for like payments; without which, indeed,
the provisions relating to government payments could hardly have
practical effect.
This consideration, however, does not apply to the matter now
before us. There is nothing in the terms of the act which looks
to any difference in its operation on different descriptions of debts
payable generally in money-that is to say, in dollars and parts of
a dollar. These terms, on the contrary, in their obvious import,
include equally all debts not specially expressed to be payable in
gold or silver, whether arising under past contracts and already
due, or arising under such contracts and to become due at a future
day, or arising and becoming due under subsequent contracts. A
strict and literal construction indeed would, as suggested by Mr.
Justice SToRt,-1 Story on Const.. §921-in respect to the same
word used in the Constitution, limit the word "debts" to debts
existing; and if this construction cannot be accepted because the
limitation sanctioned by it cannot ba recoiailel with the obvious

HIEPBURN V. GRISWOLD.

scope and purpose of the act, it is certainly conclusive against any
interpretation which will exclude 'existing debts from its opera,.
tion.
The same conclusion results from the exception of interest on
loans and duties on imports from the effect of the legal tender
clause. This exception affords an irresistible implication that no
description of debts, whenever contracted, can be withdrawn from
the effect of the act if not included within the terms of the reasonable intent of the exception.
And it is worthy of observation in this connection that in all the
debates to which the act gave occasion in Congress, no suggestion
was ever made that the legal tender clause did not apply as fully
to contracts made before as to contracts made after its passage.
These considerations seem to us conclusive. We do not think
ourselves at liberty, therefore, to say that Congress did not intend
to make the notes authorized by it a legal tender in payment of
debts contracted before the passage of the act.
We are thus brought tothe question whether Congress has power
to make notes issued under its authority a legal tender in payment
of debts which, when contracted, were payable by law in gold and
silver coin.
The delicacy and importance of this question has not been overstated in the argument. This court always approaches the consideration of questions of this nature reluctantly; and its constant
rule of decision has been, and is, that Acts of Congress must be
regarded as constitutional unless clearly shown to be otherwise.
But the Constitution is the fundamental law of the United States.
By it the people have created a government, defined its powers,
prescribed their limits, distributed them among the different departments, and directed, in general, the manner of their exercise.
No department of the government has any other powers than
those thus delegated to it by the people. All the legislative
power granted by the Constitution belongs to Congress; but ithas
no legislative power which is not thus granted. And the same
observation is equally true in its application to the executive and
judicial powers granted respectively to the President and the courts.
All these powers differ in kind, but not in source or limitation.
They all arise from the Constitution and are limited by its termsIt is the function of the judiciary to interpret and apply the law
to cases between parties as they rise for judgment. It can only
declare what the law is, and enforce, by proper process, the law
thus declared. But, in ascertaining the respective rights of parties
it frequently becomes necessary to consult the Constitution. For
there can be no law inconsistent with the fundamental law. No
enactment not in pursuance of the authority conferred by it can
create obligations or confer rights.. For such is the express declaraation of the Constitution itself in these words: "The Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any-
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thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not
withstanding."
Not every Act of Congress, then, is tobe regarded as the supreme
law of the land ; nor is it by every Act of Congress that the judges
are bound. This character and this force belong only to such acts
as are "made in pursuance of the Constitution." When, therefore,
a case arises for judicial determination, and the decision depends on
the alleged inconsistency of a legislative provision with the fundamental law, it is the plain duty of the court to compare the act
with the Constitution and if the former cannot, upon a fair construction, be reconciled with the latter, to give effect to the Constitution rather than the statute. This seems so plain that it is
impossible to make it plainer by argument. If it be otherwise the
constitution is not the supreme law; it is neither necessary or useful, in any case, to inquire whether or not any Act of Congress was
passed in pursuance of it; and the oath which every member of this
court is required to take, that he " will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and the rich and
faithfully perform the duties incumbent upon him to the best of his
ability and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and the
laws of the United States," becomes an idle and unmeaning form.
The case before us is one of private right. The plaintiff in the
court below sought to recover of the defendants a certain sum
expressed on the face of a promissory note. The defendants insisted on their right, under the Act of February 25, 1862, to acquit
themselves of their obligation by tendering in payment a sum
nominally equal in United States notes. But the note had been
executed before the passage of the act, and the plaintiff insisted on
his right under the Constitution to be paid the amount due in gold
and silver. And it has not been, and cannot be, denied that the
plaintiff was entitled to judgment according to his claim, unless
bound by a constitutional law to accept the notes as coin.
Thus two questions were directly presented: Were the defendants
relieved by the act from the obligation assumed in the contract?
Could the plaintiff be compelled, by a judgment of the court, to
receive in payment a currency of different nature and value from
that which was in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made ?
The Court of Appeals resolved both questions in the negative,
and the defendants, in'the original suit, seek the reversal of that
judgment by writ of error.
It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine whether the Act of
February, 25, 1862, so far as it makes United States notes a legal
tender in payment of debts contracted prior to its passage, is constitutional and valid or otherwise. Under a deep sense of our obligation to perform this duty to the best of our ability and understanding, we shall proceed to dispose of the case presented by the
record.
We have already said, and it is generally, if not universally.
conceded, that the Government of the United States is one of lim.
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ited powers, and that no department possesses any authority not
granted by the Constitution.
It is not necessary, however, in order to prove the existence of a
particular authority to show a particular and express grant. The
design of the Constitution was to establish a government competent
to the direction and administration of the affairs of a great nation,
and, at the same time, to mark, by sufficiently definite lines, the
sphere of its operations. To this end it was needful only to make
express grants of general powers, coupled with a further grant of
such incidental and auxiliary powers as might be required for the
exercise of the powers expressly granted. These powers are necessarily extensive. It has been found, indeed, in the practical administration of the government, that a very large part, if not the
largest part, of its functions have been performed in t4e exercise of
powers thus implied. But the extension of power by implication
was regarded with some apprehension by the wise men who framed,
and by the intelligent citizens who adopted, the Constitution. This
apprehension is manifest in the terms by which the grant of incidental and auxiliary powers is made. All powers of this nature
are included under the description of power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers expressly
granted to Congress or vested by the "Constitution in the government or any of its departments or officers.
The same apprehension is equally apparent in the tenth article
of the amendments, which declares that "the powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States or the people."
We do not mean to say that either of these constitutional provisions is to be taken as restricting any exercise of power fairly
warranted by legitimate derivation from one of the enumerated or
express powers. The first was undoubtedly introduced to exclude
all doubt in respect to the existence of implied powers; while the
words "necessary and proper" were intended to have a "sense,"
to use the words of Mr. Justice STORY, "at once admonitory and
directory," and to inquire that the means used in the execution of
an express power "should be bona fide, appropriate to the end:"
2 Story on the Const., p. 142 §1253. The second provision was
intended to have a like admonitory and directory sense, and to restrain the limited government established under the Constitution
from the exercise of powers not clearly delegated or derived by
just inference from powers so delegated.
It has not been maintained in argument, nor, indeed, would any
one, however slightly conversant with constitutional law, thinkof
maintaining that there is in the Constitution any express grant of
legislative power to make any description of credit currency a legal
tender in payment of debts.
We must inquire, then, whether this can be done in the exercise of an implied power.
The rule for determining whether a legislative enactment can be
supported as an exercise of an implied power was stated by Chiet
Justice MARSHALL, speaking for the whole court, in the case of
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McCullough v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 421; and the
statement then made has ever since been accepted as a correct exposition of the Constitution. His words were these : "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." And in another part
of the same opinion the practical application of this rule was tha..
ill ustrated: "Should Congress in the execution of its powers adopt
measures which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government, it
would be the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a deciVon come before it, to say that such an act was not the
law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government
to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department,
and tread on legislative ground:" 4 Wheat. 423.
It must be taken then as finally settled, so far as judicial decisions can settle anything, that the words "all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution" powers expressly granted or
vested, have, in the Constitution, a sense equivalent to that of the
words, laws, not absolutely necessary indeed, but appropriate,
plainly adapted to constitutional and legitimate ends; laws not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution; laws really calculated to effect objects entrusted to the
government.
The question before us, then, resolves itself into this: Is the
clause which makes United States notes a legal tender for debts
contracted prior to its enactment, a law of the description stated
in the rule ?
It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of value
by which all other values may be measured, or, in other words, to
determine what shall be lawful money and a legal tender, is in its
nature, and of necessity, a governmental power. It is in all
countries exercised by the government. In the United States, so far
as it relates to the precious metals, it is vested in Congress by the
grant of the power to coin money. But can a power to impart
these qualities to notes, or promises to pay money, when offered
in discharge of pre-existing debts, be derived from the coinage
power or from any other power expressly given?
It is certainly not the same power as the power to coin money.
Nor is it in any reasonable or satisfactory sense an appropriate or
plainly adapted means to the exercise of that power. Nor is there
more reason for saying that it is implied in, or incidental to, the
power to regulate the value of coined money of the United States,
or of foreign coins. This power of regulation is a power to determine the weight, purity, form, impression and denomination of the
several coins, and their relation to each other, and the relation of
foreign coins to the monetary unit of the United States.
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, Nor is the power to make notes a legal tender the same as the
power to issue notes to be used as currency. The old Congress,
uider the articles of confederation, was clothed by express grant
with the power to emit bills of credit, which are in fact notes for
circulation as currency; and yet that Congress was not clothed
with the power to make these bills a legal tender in payment. And
this court has recently held that the Congress, under the Constitution, possesses, as incidental to other powers, the same power as
the old Congress to emit bills or notes; but it was expressly declared at the same time that this decision concluded nothing on
the question of legal tender. Indeed, we are not aware thatithas
ever been claimed that the power to issue bills or notes has any
identity with the power to make them a legal tender. On the contrary, the whole history of the country refutes that notion. The
States have always been held to possess the power to authorize and
regulate the issue of bills for circulation by banks or individuals,
subject, as has been lately determined, to the control of Congress,
for the purpose of establishing and securing a national currency ;
and yet the States are expressly prohibited by the Constitution from
making anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender. This
seems decisive on the point that the power to issue notes and the
power to make them a legal tender are not the same pcwer, and
thawthey have no necessary connection with each other.
But it" has been maintained in argument that the power to make
United States notes a legal tender in payment of all debts is a
means appropriate and plainly adapted to the execution of the
power to carry on war, of the power to regulate commerce, and of
the power to borrow money. If it is, and is not prohibited, nor
inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Constitution, then the
Act which makes them such legal tender must be held to be constitutional.
Let us, then, first inquire whether itis an appropriate and plainly
adapted means for carrying on war? The affirmative argument
may be thus stated: Congress has power to declare and provide for
carrying on war; Congress has also power to emit bills of credit,
or circulating notes receiiable for government dues and payable,
so far at least as parties are willing to receive them, in discharge
of government obligations; it will facilitate the use of such notes
in disbursements to make them a legal tender inpayment of existing debts; therefore, Congress may make such notes a legal tender.
It is difficult to say to what express power the authority to make
notes a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts may not be
upheld as incidental, upon the principle of this argument. Is there
any power which does not involve the use of money ? And is there
any doubt that Congress may issue and use bills of credit as money
in the execution of any power ? The power to establish post-offices
and post-roads, for example, involves the collection and disbursement of a great revenue. Is not the power to make notes a legal
tender as clearly incidental to this power as to the war power ?
The answer to this question does not appear to us doubtful. The
argument, therefore, seems to prove too much. It carries the doc-
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trine of implied powers very far beyond any extent hitherto given
to it. It asserts that whatever in any degree promotes an end
within the scope of a general power, whether, in the correct sense
of the word, appropriate or not, may be done in the exercise of an
implied power.
Can this proposition be maintained?
It is said that this is not a question for the court deciding a
cause, but for Congress exercising the power. But the decisive
answer to this is that the admission of a legislative power to determine finally what powers have the described relation as means to
the execution of other powers plainly granted, and, then to exercise
absolutely and without liability to question, in cases involving
private rights, the powers thus determined to have that relation,
would completely change the nature of American government. It
would convert the government, which the people ordained as a
government of limited powers, into a government of unlimited
powers. It would confuse the boundaries which separate the executive and judicial from the legislative authority. It would obliterate every criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief Justice in the case already cited, established for the
determination of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or unconstitutional.
Undoubtedly among means appropriate, plainly adapted, rally
calculated, the legislature has unrestricted choice. But there can
be no implied power to use means not within the description.
Now, then, let it be considered what has actually been done in
in the provision of a national currency. In July and August, 1861,
and February, 1862, the issue of sixty millions of dollars in United
States notes, payable on demand, was authorized: 12 U. S. St.
259, 313 and 338. They were made receivable in payments, but
were not declared a legal tender until March, 1862-12 U. S. St.
370-when the 9mount in circulation had beer greatly reduced by
receipt and cancellation. In 1862 and 1863-12 U. S. St. 345,
532 and 709-the issue of four hundred and fifty millions in United
States notes, payable, not on demand, but, in effect, at the convenience of the government, was authorizel, subject to certain restrictions as to fifty millions. These notes were made receivable for the
bonds of the national loans, for all debts due to or from the United
States except duties on imports and interest on the public debt, and
were also declared a legal tender. In March, 1863-12 U. S. St.
711-the issue of notes for parts of a dollar was authorized to an
amount not exceeding fifty millions of dollars. These notes were
not declared a legal tender, but were made redeemable under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. In
.February, 1863-12 U. S. St. 669-the issue of three hundred
millions of dollars in notes of the national banking associations was
authorized. These nptes were made receivable to the same extent
as United States notes, and provision was made to secure their
redemption, but they were not made a legal tender.
These several descriptions of notes have since constituted, under
the various Acts of Congress, the common currency of the United
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States. The notes which were not declared a legal tender have
circulated with those which were so declared without unfavorable
discrimination.
It may be added as a part of the history that other issues, bearing interest at various rates, were authorized and made a legal
tender, except in redemption of bank notes, for face amount exclusive of interest. Such were the one and two years' five per cent.
notes and three years' compound interest notes: 13 U. S. St. 218,
425. These notes never entered largely or permanently into the
circulation; and there is no reason to think that their utility was
increased or diminished by the act which declared them a legal
tender for face amount. They need not be further considered here.
They serve only to illustrate the tendency remarked by all who
have investigated the subject of paper money, to increase the volume of irredeemable issues, and to extend indefinitely the application of the quality of legal tender. Thatit was carried no further
during the recent civil war, and has been carried no further since,
is due to circumstances, the consideration of which does'not belong
to this discussion.
We recur, then, to the question under consideration. No one
questions the general constitutionality, and not very many, perhaps, the general expediency of the legislation by which a note
currency has been authorized in recent years. The doubt is as to
the power to declare a particular class of these notes to be a legal
tender in payment of pre-existing debts.
The only ground upon which this power is asserted is, not that
the issue of notes was an appropriate and plainly adapted means of
carrying on the war, for that is admitted; but that the making of
them a legal tender to the extent mentioned was such a means.
Now, we have seen that of all the notes issued those not declared
a legal tender at all constituted a very large proportion, and that
they circulated freely and without discount.
It may be said that their equality in circulation and credit was
due to the provision made by law for the redemption of this paper
in legal tender notes. But this provision, if at all useful in this respect, was of trifling importance compared with that which made
them receivable for government dues. All modern history testifies
that, in time of war especially, when taxes are augmented, large
loans negotiated and heavy disbursements made, notes issued by the
authority of the government, and made receivable for dues of the
government, always obtain at first a ready circulation; and even
when not redeemable in coin, on demand, are as little, and usually
less, subject to depreciation than any other description of notes, for
the redemption of which no better provision is made. And the history of the legislation under consideration is that it was upon this
quality of receivability, and not upon the quality of legal tender,
that reliance for circulation was originally placed; for the receivability clause appears to have been in the original draft of the bill,
while the legal tender clause seems to have been introduced at a
later stage of its progress.
These facts are certainly not without weight as evidence that all
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the useful purposes of the notes would have been fully answered
without making them a legal tender for pre-existing debts.
It is denied, indeed, by eminent writers, that the quality of legal
tender adds anything at all to the credit or usefulness of government notes. They insist, on the contrary, that it impairs both.
However this may be, it must be remembered that it is as a means
to an end to be obtained by the action of the government that the
implied power of making notes a legal tender in all payments is
claimedunder the Constitution. Now, how far is the government
helped by this means ? Certainly it cannot obtain new supplies or
services at a cheaper rate, for no one will take the notes for more
than they are worth at the time of the new contract. The price
will rise in the ratio of depreciation, and this is all that could happen if the notes Were not made a legal tender. But it may be said
that the depreciation will be less to him who takes them from the
government, if the government will pledge to him its power to compel his creditors to receive them at par in payments. This is, as
we have seen, by no means certain. If the quantity issued be excessive, and redemption uncertain and remote, great depreciation
will take place; if, on the other hand, the quantity is only adequate to the demands of business, and confidence in early redemption is strong, the notes will circulate freely, whether made a legal
tender or not.
But if it be admitted that some increase of availability is derived
from makingthe notes a legal tender under new contracts, it by no
means follows that any appreciable advantage is gained by compelling creditors to receive them in satisfaction of pre-existing
debts. And there is abundant evidence that whatever benefit is
possible from that compulsion to some individuals or to the government, is far more than outweighed by the losses of property, the
derangement of business, the fluctuations of currency and values,
and the increase of prices to the people and the government, and
the long train of evils which flow from the use of irredeemable
paper money. It is true that these evils are not to be attributed
altogether to making it a legal tender. But 'this increases these
evils. It certainly widens their extent and Protracts their continuance.
We are unable to persuade ourselves that an expedient of this
sort is an appropriate and plainly adapted means for the execution
of the power to declare and carry on war. If it adds nothing to
the utility of the notes it cannot be upheld as a means to the end
in furtherance of which the notes are issued. Nor can it, in our
judgment, be upheld as such if, while facilitating in some degree
the circulation of the notes, it debases and injures the currency in
its proper use to a much greater degree. And these considerations
seem to us equally applicable to the powers to regulate commerce
and to borrow money. Both powers necessarily involve the use of
money by the people and by the government, but neither, as we
think, carries with it, as an appropriate and plainly adapted means
to its exercise, the power of making circulating notes a legal tender
in payment of pre-existing debts.
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But there is another view, which seems to us decisive, to what.
ever express power the supposed implied power in question may be
referred. In the rule stated by Chief Justice MARSHALL the words
appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated, are qualified by the
limitation that the means must not be prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing so prohibited or inconsistent can be regarded as appropriate, or plainly
adapted, or really calculated means to any end.
Let us inquire, then, first, whether making bills of credit a legal
tender, to the extent indicated, is consistent with the spirit of the
Constitution.
Among the great cardinal principles of that instrument no one
is more conspicuous or more venerable than the establishment of
justice. And what was intended by the establishment of justice in
the minds of the people who ordained it is, happily, not a matthr
of disputation. It is not left to inference or conjecture, especially
in its relations to contracts.
When the Constitution was undergoing discussion in the convention, the Congress of the confederation was engaged in the consideration of the ordinance for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio, the only territory subject at that time to its
regulation and control. By this ordinance certain fundamental articles of compact were established between the original States and
the people and States of the territory, for the purpose, to use its
own language, "of extending the fundamental principles of civil
and religious liberty, whereon these republics" (the States united
under the confederation), " their laws and constitutions are
erected." Among these fundamental principles was this:°"And in
the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and
declared that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the
said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or
affect private contracts or engagements bona fide and without fraud
previously formed."
The same principle found more condensed expression in that
most valuable provision of the Constitution of the United States,
ever recognized as an efficient safeguard against injustice, that "no
State shall pass any law impairing the object of the contracts."
It is true, this prohibition is not applied in terms to the government of the United States. Congress has express power to enact
bankrupt laws, and we do not say that a law made in the execution
of any other express power, which, incidentally only, impairs the
obligation of a contract, can be held to be unconstitutional for that
reason.
But we think it clear that those who framed and those who
adopted the Constitution intended that the spirit of this prohibition
should prevade the entire body of legislation, and that the justice
which the Constitution was ordained to establish was not thought
by them to be compatible with legislation of an opposite tendency.
In other words, we cannot doubt that a law not make in pursuance
of an express power, which necessarily and in its direct operation
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impairs the obligation of contracts, is inconsistent with the spirit
of the Constitution.
Another provision, found in the fifth amendment, must be considered in this connection. We refer to that which ordains that
private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation. This provision is kindred in spirit to that which forbids
legislation impairing the obligation of contracts; but, unlike that,
it is addressed directly and solely to the national government. It
does not, in terms, prohibit legislation which appropriates the
private property of one class of citizens to the use of another class;
but if such property cannot be taken for the benefit of all, without
compensation, it is difficult to understand how it can be so taken
for the benefit of a part without violating the spirit of the prohibition.
But there is another provision in the same amendment, which, in
our judgment, cannot have its full and intended effect unless construed as a direct prohibition of the legislation which we have been
considering. It is that which declares that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
It is not doubted that all the provisions of this amendment op.
crate directly in limitation and restraint of the legislative powers
conferred by the Constitution. The only question is whether an
act which compels all those who hold contracts for the payment of
gold and silver money to accept in payment a currency of inferior
value deprives such persons of property without due process of law.
It is quite clear that, whatever may be the operation of such an
act, due .process of law makes no part of it. Does it deprive any
person of property?
A very large proportion of the property of civilized men exists
in the form of contracts. These contracts almost invariably stipulate for the payment of money. And we have already seen that
contracts in the United States, prior to the act under consideration,
for the payment of money were contracts to pay the sums specified
in gold and silver coin. And it is beyond doubt that the holders of
these contracts were and are as fully entitled to the protection of
this constitutional provision as the holders of any description of
property.
But it may be said that the holders of no description of property
are-protected by it from legislation which incidentally only impairs
its value. And it may be urged in illustration that the holders of
stock in a turnpike, a bridge, or a manufacturing corporation, or
an insurance company, or a bank, cannot invoke its protection
against legislation which, by authorizing similar works or corporations, reduces its price in the market. But all this does not appear to
meet the real difficulty. In the cases mentioned the injury is purely
contingent and incidental. In the case we are considering it is
direct and inevitable.
If in the cases mentioned the holders of the stock were required by
law to convey it on demand to any one who should think fit to offer
half its value for 't, the analogy would be more obvious. No one
probably could be found to contend that an act enforcing the
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acceptance of fifty or seventy-five acres of land in satisfaction of a
contract to convey a hundred would not come within the prohibition against arbitrary privation of property.
We confess ourselves unable to perceive any solid distinction
between such an act and an act compelling all citizens to accept,
in satisfaction of all contracts for money, half or three-quarters or
any other proportion less than the whole of the value actually due
according to their terms. It is difficult to conceive what act would
take private property without process of law if such on act would
not.
We are obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to
pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted
is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to
carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; that such
an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and that
it is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is not surprising that amid the tumult of the late civil war
and under the influence of apprehensions .forthe safety of the republic almost universal, different views, never before entertained by
American statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The time
was not favorable to considerate reflection upon the constitutional
limits of legislative or executive authority. If power was assumed
from patriotic motives, the assumption found ready justification in
patriotic hearts. Many who doubted, yielded their doubts; many
who did not doubt were silent. Some who were strongly averse
to making government notes a legal tender felt themselves constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advocates of the measure.
Not a few who theainsisted upon its necessity, oracquiesced in that
view, have, since the return of peace, and under the influence of the
cilmer time, reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in
those which we have just announced. These conclusions seem to
us to be fully sanctioned by the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
We are obliged, therefore, to hold that the defendant in error
was not bound to receive from the plaintiffs the currency tendered
to him in payment of their note, made before the passage of the
Act of February 25, 1862. It follows that -the judgment of the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky must be affirmed.
It is proper to say that Mr. Justice GRIEr, who was amember of
the court when this cause was decided in conference, and when this
opinion was directed to be read, stated his judgment to be that the
legal tender clause, properly construed, has no application to debts,
contracted prior to its enactment; but that upon the construction
given to the act by the other judges he concurred in the opinion that
the clause, so far as it makes United States notes a legal tender
for such debts, is not warranted by the Constitution.
MILLEa J., delivered a dissentin- opinion, w:th which SwAYNI
and DAVIs, JJ., concurred.

